GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-69xr-m8h6-h664 Angular SSR has Open Redirect and Request Steering via Encoded X-Forwarded-Prefix

MEDIUM Published 2026-05-06 Modified 2026-05-14 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-44437
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
@angular/ssr
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-22, CWE-601
Reviewed
2026-05-06

Affected packages

• npm @angular/ssr: >= 22.0.0-next.0, < 22.0.0-next.7 → fixed in 22.0.0-next.7 • npm @angular/ssr: >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.2.9 → fixed in 21.2.9 • npm @angular/ssr: >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.25 → fixed in 20.3.25 • npm @angular/ssr: >= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.25 → fixed in 19.2.25

Description

Description A vulnerability exists in the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header processing logic within Angular SSR. The internal validation mechanism fails to properly account for URL-encoded characters, specifically dots (`%2e%2e`). This allows an attacker to bypass security filters by injecting encoded path traversal sequences that are later decoded and utilized by the application logic. When an Angular SSR application is configured to trust proxy headers and is deployed behind a proxy that forwards the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header without prior sanitization, an attacker can provide a payload such as `/%2e%2e/evil`. The vulnerability manifests in two ways: • Open Redirect: The application processes a redirect (e.g., router `redirectTo`). The decoded traversal payload manipulates the Location header, forcing the browser to an unintended path or external domain. • Server-Side Request Steering: The manipulated prefix is used as the base path for server-side `HttpClient` requests. This causes the server to make requests to unintended internal paths or external endpoints. Attack Preconditions • The application must use Angular SSR. • The application must perform internal redirects or use relative URLs in server-side `HttpClient` requests. • The upstream infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header to the SSR process without stripping or sanitizing it. Workarounds Until the patch is applied, developers should manually sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their `server.ts`. The workaround involves decoding the component to catch encoded traversal attempts before normalization: ```ts app.use((req, res, next) => { let prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']; if (Array.isArray(prefix)) prefix = prefix[0]; if (prefix) { try { // Decode the prefix to catch encoded characters like %2e (dots) const decodedPrefix = decodeURIComponent(prefix); // Sanitize: remove traversal attempts and ensure a safe leading slash req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = decodedPrefix .replace(/\.\./g, '') // Remove any dot-dot sequences .replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/'); // Ensure it starts with exactly one slash } catch (e) { // If decoding fails, remove the potentially malicious header entirely delete req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']; } } next(); }); ``` Configuring Trusted Proxy Headers By default, Angular ignores all X-Forwarded-* headers. If your application is behind a trusted reverse proxy (like a load balancer) that sets these headers, you can configure Angular to trust them. You can configure trustProxyHeaders when initializing the application engine: ```ts const appEngine = new AngularAppEngine({ // Trust specific headers trustProxyHeaders: ['x-forwarded-host', 'x-forwarded-proto', 'x-forwarded-prefix'], }); const nodeAppEngine = new AngularNodeAppEngine({ // Trust all X-Forwarded-* headers trustProxyHeaders: true, }); ``` Patches • 22.0.0-next.7 • 21.2.9 • 20.3.25 • 19.2.25 Resources • https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/33031 • https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#configuring-trusted-proxy-headers

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-44437 The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory weakness
  • CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site weakness

References