GHSA-6gh2-q7cp-9qf6 Open WebUI has Stored Cross-Site Scripting In Profile Picture

• PyPI open-webui: < 0.8.0 → fixed in 0.8.0

Summary The `profile_image_url` field on the user profile update form accepted arbitrary `data:` URI values without MIME-type validation. Two distinct attack paths were independently demonstrated by separate reporters: 1. `data:text/html;base64,...` in a new browser tab (raresvis, 2025-04-17) — when a victim right-clicks a user's profile picture and chooses "Open image in new tab", the browser navigates to the data: URL and executes embedded scripts in the `data:` origin. Limited to social-engineering / redirect attacks because the script does not run in the application origin. 2. `data:image/svg+xml;base64,...` re-served by the application origin (Gh05t666nero, 2026-01-09) — `GET /api/v1/users/{user_id}/profile/image` decoded the base64 and returned `StreamingResponse(media_type=)` extracted from the `data:` header. With `media_type=image/svg+xml` and `Content-Disposition: inline`, the SVG-embedded scripts executed in the application origin, enabling JWT theft from `localStorage` and full account takeover of any user — including admins — who loaded the malicious profile image URL. Both attack paths share the same root cause (lack of MIME-type validation on `profile_image_url`) and are closed by the same fix. Vulnerable code (v0.7.0) `backend/open_webui/routers/users.py` `get_user_profile_image_by_id()`: ```python elif user.profile_image_url.startswith("data:image"): header, base64_data = user.profile_image_url.split(",", 1) image_data = base64.b64decode(base64_data) image_buffer = io.BytesIO(image_data) media_type = header.split(";")[0].lstrip("data:") # user-controlled return StreamingResponse( image_buffer, media_type=media_type, headers={"Content-Disposition": "inline"}, ) ``` Fix Commit `773787c74` (2026-02-11), first contained in tag v0.8.0, applies the `validate_profile_image_url` field validator to every form that accepts `profile_image_url` (`UserModel`, `UpdateProfileForm`, `SignupForm` in `backend/open_webui/models/users.py` and `backend/open_webui/models/auths.py`). The validator explicitly rejects `data:image/svg+xml` and any non-image data URI, allowing only `data:image/{png,jpeg,gif,webp};base64` plus known internal paths and `http(s)://` URLs. This blocks both attack vectors at form submission time, so a malicious URL can no longer be persisted to the database. Credits • raresvis — discovered the `data:text/html`-via-new-tab path • Gh05t666nero — discovered the `data:image/svg+xml`-via-server-side path (the more severe origin-XSS vector that determined the consolidated CVSS) Per our Report Handling policy, the cluster is consolidated into the earliest filing with credit to every reporter who demonstrated a distinct exploitation path. Affected / patched versions • Affected: `= 0.8.0`