GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks

HIGH Published 2026-07-24 Modified 2026-07-24 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
GitPython
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-184, CWE-78
Reviewed
2026-07-24

Affected packages

• PyPI GitPython: < 3.1.54 → fixed in 3.1.54

Description

Summary GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=` copies `/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration. Root Cause `base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense. Impact Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H. Proof of Concept ```python attacker stages /hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x) from git import Repo Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='') # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified) ``` Attack Chain 1. Setup: attacker stages `/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem). 2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='')`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`. Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate `['--template']`, no error). 3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created). Bypass Evidence Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout` hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory. Affected Versions `<= 3.1.53` Suggested Fix Add `--template` (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`. --- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Related

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs weakness
  • CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command weakness

References