GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf GitPython: Incomplete unsafe_git_clone_options denylist omits --template enabling arbitrary command execution via clone hooks
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- GitPython
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-184, CWE-78
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-24
Affected packages
• PyPI GitPython: < 3.1.54 → fixed in 3.1.54
Description
Summary
GitPython's `unsafe_git_clone_options` denylist omits `--template`. `git clone --template=` copies `/hooks/` into the new repository and runs them (`post-checkout` fires during clone), so a caller who can influence clone options can achieve arbitrary command execution in the default `allow_unsafe_options=False` configuration.
Root Cause
`base.py:145-152` defines `unsafe_git_clone_options = ["--upload-pack","-u","--config","-c"]` — `--template` is absent. The guard candidate `['--template']` passes `check_unsafe_options` (verified). git copies the hook directory and executes `post-checkout` at checkout time. git's `protocol.allow`/`GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL` do not gate `--template`; the incomplete denylist is the only defense.
Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution during clone (default config). Requires an attacker-readable directory containing an executable hook — a genuine second precondition (realistic via shared filesystems, upload dirs, `/tmp`, or attacker-writable network paths), reflected as AC:H.
Proof of Concept
```python
attacker stages /hooks/post-checkout (chmod +x)
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst, template='') # post-checkout hook executes -> marker created (verified)
```
Attack Chain
1. Setup: attacker stages `/hooks/post-checkout` (chmod +x). Guard: n/a (filesystem).
2. Entry: `Repo.clone_from(url, path, template='')`. Guard: `check_unsafe_options(candidates=['--template'], unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)`. Bypass proof: `--template` not on the denylist -> passes (verified candidate `['--template']`, no error).
3. Sink: git copies the hook and executes `post-checkout` at checkout. Impact: ACE, default config (verified marker created).
Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): guard candidate `['--template']` passed with no error; staged `post-checkout` hook executed during `clone_from`, creating the marker. Independent of the value-smuggle bypass (`--template` is a legitimate long option that survives any single-char-value fix). Not covered by any existing advisory.
Affected Versions
`<= 3.1.53`
Suggested Fix
Add `--template` (and audit for other hook/exec-influencing options) to `unsafe_git_clone_options`.
---
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
Related
References
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-6p8h-3wgx-97gf web
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180 web
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ffcb5359e87619f4fe4a70a4aff5f08c5580ba97 web
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython package
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54 web