GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-73hc-m4hx-79pj mcp-memory-service Vulnerable to System Information Disclosure via Health Endpoint
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-29787
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- mcp-memory-service
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-200
- Reviewed
- 2026-03-05
Affected packages
• PyPI mcp-memory-service: < 10.21.0 → fixed in 10.21.0
Description
Summary
The `/api/health/detailed` endpoint returns detailed system information including OS version, Python version, CPU count, memory totals, disk usage, and the full database filesystem path. When `MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true` is set (required for the HTTP server to function without OAuth/API key), this endpoint is accessible without authentication. Combined with the default `0.0.0.0` binding, this exposes sensitive reconnaissance data to the entire network.
Details
Vulnerable Code
`health.py:90-101` - System information collection
```python
system_info = {
"platform": platform.system(), # e.g., "Linux", "Darwin"
"platform_version": platform.version(), # Full OS kernel version string
"python_version": platform.python_version(),# e.g., "3.12.1"
"cpu_count": psutil.cpu_count(), # CPU core count
"memory_total_gb": round(memory_info.total / (10243), 2),
"memory_available_gb": round(memory_info.available / (10243), 2),
"memory_percent": memory_info.percent,
"disk_total_gb": round(disk_info.total / (10243), 2),
"disk_free_gb": round(disk_info.free / (10243), 2),
"disk_percent": round((disk_info.used / disk_info.total) * 100, 2)
}
```
`health.py:131-132` - Database path disclosure
```python
if hasattr(storage, 'db_path'):
storage_info["database_path"] = storage.db_path # Full filesystem path
```
Authentication Bypass Path
The `/api/health/detailed` endpoint uses `require_read_access` which calls `get_current_user`. When `MCP_ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS=true`, the auth middleware grants access:
```python
middleware.py:372-379
if ALLOW_ANONYMOUS_ACCESS:
logger.debug("Anonymous access explicitly enabled, granting read-only access")
return AuthenticationResult(
authenticated=True,
client_id="anonymous",
scope="read",
auth_method="none"
)
```
Note: The basic `/health` endpoint (line 68) has no auth dependency at all and returns version and uptime information unconditionally.
Information Exposed
| Field | Example Value | Reconnaissance Value |
|-------|--------------|---------------------|
| `platform` | `"Linux"` | OS fingerprinting |
| `platform_version` | `"#1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC..."` | Kernel version → CVE targeting |
| `python_version` | `"3.12.1"` | Python CVE targeting |
| `cpu_count` | `8` | Resource enumeration |
| `memory_total_gb` | `32.0` | Infrastructure profiling |
| `database_path` | `"/home/user/.mcp-memory/memories.db"` | Username + file path disclosure |
| `database_size_mb` | `45.2` | Data volume estimation |
Attack Scenario
1. Attacker scans the local network for services on port 8000
2. Finds mcp-memory-service with HTTP enabled and anonymous access
3. Calls `GET /api/health/detailed` (no credentials needed)
4. Receives OS version, Python version, full database path (revealing username), system resources
5. Uses this information to:
• Target known CVEs for the specific OS/Python version
• Identify the database file location for potential direct access
• Profile the system for further attacks
PoC
```python
Show the system info that would be exposed
import platform, psutil
system_info = {
"platform": platform.system(),
"platform_version": platform.version(),
"python_version": platform.python_version(),
"cpu_count": psutil.cpu_count(),
"memory_total_gb": round(psutil.virtual_memory().total / (10243), 2),
}
print(system_info) # All of this is returned to unauthenticated users
```
Impact
• OS fingerprinting: Exact OS and kernel version enables targeted exploit selection
• Path disclosure: Database path reveals username, home directory structure, and file locations
• Resource enumeration: CPU, memory, and disk info reveal infrastructure scale
• Reconnaissance enablement: Combined information significantly reduces attacker effort for follow-up attacks
Remediation
1. Remove system details from default health endpoint - return only `status`, `version`, `uptime`:
```python
@router.get("/health/detailed")
async def detailed_health_check(
storage: MemoryStorage = Depends(get_storage),
user: AuthenticationResult = Depends(require_write_access) # Require admin/write access
):
# Only return storage stats, not system info
...
```
2. Do not expose `database_path` - this leaks the filesystem structure:
```python
Remove or redact
storage_info["database_path"] = storage.db_path # REMOVE THIS
```
3. Add auth to basic `/health` or limit it to status-only (no version):
```python
@router.get("/health")
async def health_check():
return {"status": "healthy"} # No version, no uptime
```
Alternatively, Bind to `127.0.0.1` by default** instead of `0.0.0.0`, preventing network-based reconnaissance entirely:
```python
In config.py — change default from '0.0.0.0' to '127.0.0.1'
HTTP_HOST = os.getenv('MCP_HTTP_HOST', '127.0.0.1')
```
Users who need network access can explicitly set `MCP_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0`, making the exposure a conscious opt-in rather than a default.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-29787 mcp-memory-service is an open-source memory backend for multi-agent systems. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor weakness