GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-73p9-6hrp-8qhr AIIR verification and policy gates could report success without enforcing the control (fail-open)
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- aiir
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-347, CWE-636
- Reviewed
- 2026-08-28
Affected packages
• PyPI aiir: < 1.7.0 → fixed in 1.7.0
Description
Summary
Several of AIIR's verification and policy paths could return a success/"verified" result without actually enforcing the control they represent — they could fail open rather than fail closed. For a tool whose purpose is trustworthy verification, a consumer relying on these gates may have treated unverified or non-conforming input as verified.
Found during an internal adversarial hardening review of AIIR (not a third-party audit). All paths are fixed in 1.7.0.
Affected paths
• A `require_signing` policy gate could be satisfied by a forgeable/empty field, so an unsigned or forged-bundle receipt could pass a "signing required" check without a valid signature.
• A CI verification path could report `success` regardless of the underlying verification result.
• A release-verification gate could advertise policy limits it did not actually enforce.
• A signature-verification path could be silently skipped for certain input categories, exiting success without verifying.
Impact
A consumer relying on these gates (e.g. `require_signing`, release/policy verification, or the CI check) to block unsigned, forged, or non-conforming receipts could have received a false "verified"/"pass". Exploitation requires reliance on the affected gate; it does not forge valid signatures, nor does it compromise content-addressing or correctly-signed receipts.
Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0. Every affected path now fails closed, each with a regression test. Upgrade to `aiir >= 1.7.0`.
Workarounds
None for earlier versions other than upgrading. Full cryptographic Sigstore verification (`pip install aiir[sign]`, `--verify-signature` with `--signer-identity`/`--signer-issuer`) provides defense in depth.
Scope note
This advisory covers code present in released versions (`< 1.7.0`). Separately, an unreleased agent-receipt feature had pre-release forgery findings fixed before it shipped — those were never in a released version and are out of scope.