GHSA-74m3-9qvm-rp9h zrok: WebDAV drive backend follows symlinks outside DriveRoot, enabling host filesystem read/write

• Go github.com/openziti/zrok: <= 1.1.11 (no fix yet) • Go github.com/openziti/zrok/v2: < 2.0.2 → fixed in 2.0.2

Summary The zrok WebDAV drive backend (davServer.Dir) restricts path traversal through lexical normalization but does not prevent symlink following. When a symbolic link inside the shared DriveRoot points to a location outside that root, remote WebDAV consumers can read files and—on shares without OS-level permission restrictions—write or overwrite files anywhere on the host filesystem accessible to the zrok process. • Attack Vector: Network — exploitation is performed entirely over the WebDAV endpoint; the attacker issues HTTP requests to the public zrok share URL. • Attack Complexity: High — a precondition outside the attacker's direct control must hold: a symlink pointing outside DriveRoot must already exist within it (created locally, not via WebDAV). • Privileges Required: None — zrok share public --backend-mode drive exposes the WebDAV endpoint with no authentication by default. • User Interaction: None — once the symlink precondition is met, exploitation requires no user interaction. • Scope: Changed — the vulnerability allows an attacker to escape the WebDAV root (the security boundary) and access the broader host filesystem. • Confidentiality Impact: High — arbitrary files readable by the zrok process can be retrieved. • Integrity Impact: High — the WebDAV PUT handler opens files with O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, meaning symlink targets outside DriveRoot can be overwritten (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys). • Availability Impact: None — no direct availability impact. Affected Components • drives/davServer/file.go — Dir.OpenFile (line 140), Dir.Stat (line 176), Dir.Mkdir (line 133), Dir.RemoveAll (line 151) • endpoints/drive/backend.go — NewBackend (line 51–52)