GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-83vm-p52w-f9pw vLLM: extract_hidden_states speculative decoding crashes server on any request with penalty parameters

MEDIUM Published 2026-05-06 Modified 2026-06-08 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-44223
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
vllm
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-131, CWE-704
Reviewed
2026-05-06

Affected packages

• PyPI vllm: >= 0.18.0, < 0.20.0 → fixed in 0.20.0

Description

Summary The `extract_hidden_states` speculative decoding proposer in vLLM returns a tensor with an incorrect shape after the first decode step, causing a `RuntimeError` that crashes the EngineCore process. The crash is triggered when any request in the batch uses sampling penalty parameters (`repetition_penalty`, `frequency_penalty`, or `presence_penalty`). A single request with a penalty parameter (e.g., `"repetition_penalty": 1.1`) is sufficient to crash the server. The crash is deterministic and immediate — no concurrency, race condition, or special workload is required. Details In vLLM v0.17.0, the `extract_hidden_states` proposer's `propose()` method returned `sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1)`, producing a tensor of shape `(batch_size, 1)`. In PR #37013 (first released in v0.18.0), the KV connector interface was refactored out of `propose()`. The return type changed from `tuple[Tensor, KVConnectorOutput | None]` to `Tensor`, and the `.unsqueeze(-1)` call was removed along with the KV connector output: ```python Before (v0.17.0): return sampled_token_ids.unsqueeze(-1), kv_connector_output # shape (batch_size, 1) After (v0.18.0+): return sampled_token_ids # shape (batch_size, 2) after first decode step ``` The refactor missed that `sampled_token_ids` changed semantics between the first and subsequent decode steps. After the first decode step, the rejection sampler allocates its output as `(batch_size, max_spec_len + 1)`. With `num_speculative_tokens=1`, this produces shape `(batch_size, 2)` instead of the expected `(batch_size, 1)`, causing a broadcast shape mismatch during penalty application. Impact Any vLLM deployment between v0.18.0 and v0.19.1 (inclusive) configured with `extract_hidden_states` speculative decoding is affected. A single API request containing any penalty parameter immediately and permanently crashes the EngineCore process, resulting in complete loss of service availability. Patches Fixed in PR #38610, first included in vLLM v0.20.0. The fix slices the return value to `sampled_token_ids[:, :1]`, ensuring the correct `(batch_size, 1)` shape regardless of the rejection sampler's output dimensions. Workarounds • Upgrade to vLLM v0.20.0 or later. • If upgrading is not possible, avoid using `extract_hidden_states` as the speculative decoding method on affected versions. • Alternatively, reject or strip penalty parameters (`repetition_penalty`, `frequency_penalty`, `presence_penalty`) from incoming requests at an API gateway before they reach vLLM.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-44223 vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-131 Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size weakness
  • CWE-704 Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast weakness

References