GHSA-84jc-3hj2-hwc7 kanidmd_lib: Image upload validators run before authorization; PNG validator panics on malformed input

• crates.io kanidmd_lib: < 1.9.3 → fixed in 1.9.3

Summary The `POST /v1/domain/_image` and `POST /v1/oauth2/{rs_name}/_image` handlers call `validate_image()` on the uploaded body before the ACL check that restricts image upload to admins. Any bug in an image validator is therefore reachable by an unauthenticated remote client rather than being admin-gated. One such bug exists today: `png_has_trailer()` panics on inputs shorter than 8 bytes, or whose first chunk-length field is near `u32::MAX`. On a default build this has no server-wide impact. The panic unwinds only the requester's own tokio task; the server process survives, no shared state is poisoned, and other connections are unaffected. This was reported privately rather than as a public issue because (a) the project previously treated an admin-triggered thread crash of identical impact as security-relevant (e51d0dee4), and this is reachable by a broader population; and (b) a downstream build with `panic = "abort"` would upgrade it to an unauthenticated process-crash DoS. Details Validate-before-authorize ordering Both handlers parse and validate attacker-controlled bytes before checking whether the caller is permitted to upload at all: • `server/core/src/https/v1_domain.rs:118` — `image.validate_image()` runs; `handle_image_update(client_auth_info, …)` (the ACL check) is at line 129. • `server/core/src/https/v1_oauth2.rs:550` — same ordering. The `VerifiedClientInformation` extractor (`server/core/src/https/extractors/mod.rs:18-90`) always returns `Ok` — it builds a `ClientAuthInfo` from whatever credentials are present (including none) and does not reject anonymous callers. Authorization is deferred to `handle_image_update()`, which is never reached if the validator panics or errors first. PNG validator panic (demonstrator) `validate_image()` (`server/lib/src/valueset/image/mod.rs:98`) checks only a 256 KiB maximum size, not a minimum, before dispatching to the format-specific validator. Short input — `server/lib/src/valueset/image/png.rs:73-76`: ```rust pub fn png_has_trailer(contents: &Vec) -> Result { let buf = contents.as_slice(); let (magic, buf) = buf.split_at(PNG_PRELUDE.len()); // 8; panics if len /tmp/short.png curl -sk https://$KANIDM_HOST/v1/domain/_image \ -F 'image=@/tmp/short.png;type=image/png;filename=x.png' → connection reset / empty reply; server process remains up ``` Unit-test confirmation (`cargo test -p kanidmd_lib --lib`): ```rust [test] fn audit_png_short_input_panics() { let short = vec![0x89u8, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47]; assert!(std::panic::catch_unwind(|| png_has_trailer(&short)).is_err()); } [test] fn audit_png_chunk_length_overflow_panics() { let mut data = vec![0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]; data.extend_from_slice(&[0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD]); data.extend_from_slice(b"IHDR"); data.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 8]); assert!(std::panic::catch_unwind(|| png_has_trailer(&data)).is_err()); } ``` Both tests pass (i.e. both inputs panic). Impact The only party affected is the requester, whose own connection is dropped. Repeating the request has no cumulative effect beyond ordinary request load. On the upstream build: • Each connection runs in its own `tokio::task::spawn` (`server/core/src/https/mod.rs:481`); the accept loop continues after a task panic. • No `panic = "abort"` in any workspace `[profile.*]`. • No `Mutex`/`RwLock` held across the call site; nothing is poisoned. • The panic occurs before any write actor is messaged; no DB or replication state is touched. Residual risk: a downstream packager that sets `panic = "abort"` (or links code that installs an abort handler) would see a full unauthenticated process crash. (No such packager is known) Affected: v1.1.0-rc.15 (introduced in e7f594a1c, #2112) through `master` @ edf50b9da.