GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Maven

GHSA-8h4c-x2wg-6xp8 Http4s Ember accepts Transfer-Encoding combined with Content-Length (CL.TE request smuggling)

CRITICAL Published 2026-09-15 Modified 2026-09-15 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-69204
Ecosystem
Maven
Packages
org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3
Severity
Critical
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-444
Reviewed
2026-09-15

Affected packages

• Maven org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12: < 0.23.35 → fixed in 0.23.35 • Maven org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13: < 0.23.35 → fixed in 0.23.35 • Maven org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3: < 0.23.35 → fixed in 0.23.35 • Maven org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13: >= 1.0.0-M1, < 1.0.0-M47 → fixed in 1.0.0-M47 • Maven org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3: >= 1.0.0-M1, < 1.0.0-M47 → fixed in 1.0.0-M47

Description

Summary Ember's HTTP/1.1 request parser does not reject a message that carries both a `Transfer-Encoding` and a `Content-Length` header. RFC 9112 §6.1 requires a server to treat such a message as a framing error and close the connection. An intermediary that follows the RFC's CL-strip-and-forward path (or that prioritises `Content-Length`) will frame the body differently from Ember, enabling HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE). Impact Server Request smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards both headers over a keep-alive backend connection and frames by `Content-Length` while Ember frames by chunked: • Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers. • Cross-user request hijack: a dangling smuggled prefix concatenates with the next victim's request on the shared backend socket, capturing its headers. • Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy. Client ember-client shares the same parser on the response path. An upstream that sends both headers can desync a pooled client connection. This requires a malicious or compromised upstream. Preconditions • Unauthenticated remote attacker (server) • ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary • Intermediary forwards a request carrying both `Transfer-Encoding` and `Content-Length` (RFC says it MAY reject; many forward) and frames by `Content-Length` • Malicious or compromised upstream (client) Workarounds • Intermediary strictly rejects requests carrying both `Transfer-Encoding` and `Content-Length` • Intermediary buffers and re-encodes request bodies • Disable backend keep-alive between the intermediary and Ember

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-69204 Http4s is a Scala interface for HTTP services. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-444 Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests weakness

References