GHSA-8mgp-746c-j5xp NLTK: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots

• PyPI nltk: < 3.10.4 → fixed in 3.10.4

Summary Several model-artifact APIs still treat caller-controlled model paths as ordinary filenames even when NLTK path security is enforced. The same outside-root paths are rejected by guarded helpers, but these public read and write flows still use raw file APIs. Details • Vulnerability type: File sandbox bypass • Affected component: `TransitionParser.train`, `TransitionParser.parse`, `AveragedPerceptron.save`, `AveragedPerceptron.load`, `PerceptronTagger.save_to_json`, `save_maxent_params` • Affected versions: Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced. • Patched versions: Not yet patched • Root cause: Model import and export helpers use built-in `open()` on caller-controlled paths instead of pathsec-aware helpers. `TransitionParser.train()` writes outside allowed roots, `TransitionParser.parse()` reads outside allowed roots, `AveragedPerceptron` bypasses the sandbox in both directions, and adjacent read-side helpers in the same family already show the intended guarded behavior. I confirmed outside-root reads and writes while `pathsec.open()` or the guarded sibling helpers rejected the same paths. PoC Preconditions • The application enables `pathsec` enforcement and lets untrusted workflows choose model import or export paths. Steps 1. Enable `pathsec.ENFORCE=True` and restrict allowed roots to a dedicated sandbox directory. 2. Use public model import or export APIs with paths that point outside that root. 3. Observe the same paths are rejected by negative-control guarded helpers such as `pathsec.open()`, `PerceptronTagger.load_from_json()`, or `load_maxent_params()`. 4. Observe the vulnerable APIs still read or write outside-root files successfully. Minimal reproducible excerpt ```text transition_train_exists True transition_parse_loader_read_bytes 13 averaged_load_keys ['bias'] maxent_save wrote ['alwayson.tab', 'labels.txt'] ``` Impact Consumers that rely on `pathsec` for local containment can be tricked into reading or overwriting files outside approved roots through normal model persistence and loading APIs. Remediation Route all model-path file access through `nltk.pathsec.open()` or existing pathsec-aware helpers, and add regression tests that pair each vulnerable API with a negative control on the same path. References • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/parse/transitionparser.py#L551-L571 • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tag/perceptron.py#L106-L113 • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/tag/perceptron.py#L262-L273 • https://github.com/nltk/nltk/blob/v3.10.0-rc2/nltk/classify/maxent.py#L1583-L1602