GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-9237-rg5p-rhfw @saltcorn/data: Tenant user role is used for tenant creation role check

HIGH Published 2026-04-22 Modified 2026-04-22 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
@saltcorn/data
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Weaknesses
CWE-863
Reviewed
2026-04-22

Affected packages

• npm @saltcorn/data: < 1.4.4 → fixed in 1.4.4 • npm @saltcorn/data: >= 1.5.0-beta.0, < 1.5.2 → fixed in 1.5.2 • npm @saltcorn/data: >= 1.6.0-alpha.0, < 1.6.0-beta.2 → fixed in 1.6.0-beta.2

Description

Summary When a tenant admin is logged out of the root domain (e.g., saltcorn.com) but logged in to their own tenant space as admin, they can simply append `/tenant/create` to their tenant URL. The system reads the role from the tenant context (admin), and a new tenant is created on the root domain (in `PUBLIC SCHEMA > _sc_tenants`), rather than in the tenant's own `_sc_tenants` table. If the same logic applies to other routes, a tenant admin effectively gains admin rights on the root domain. PoC A tenant-created subtenant appears under the Saltcorn public schema instead of the tenant's own schema. • Even when `role_id=1` is required for tenant creation on saltcorn.com (only admin can create tenants), existing tenant admins can still create new tenants because their local `role_id:1` is evaluated against the root domain. • Even when `role_to_create_tenant` is set to `0` in the tenant's `_sc_config` schema, or removed entirely, the tenant admin can still create sub-tenants on the root domain — suggesting `role_to_create_tenant` is not being read at all. Impact Tenant admins gain unauthorized admin-level access to the root domain. Any authenticated tenant admin can perform privileged operations (e.g., creating tenants) on the root domain by exploiting the role context mismatch.

Related

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization weakness

References