GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtil

• Packagist symfony/ux-autocomplete: >= 2.2.0, < 2.36.0 → fixed in 2.36.0 • Packagist symfony/ux-autocomplete: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.0 → fixed in 3.1.0

Description `Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard. Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose. Resolution `EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE '\'` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged. The patch for this issue is available here for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x). Credits Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.