GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-9vqf-7f2p-gf9v Hono: bodyLimit() can be bypassed for chunked / unknown-length requests
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-44456
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- hono
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-400
- Reviewed
- 2026-05-06
Affected packages
• npm hono: < 4.12.16 → fixed in 4.12.16
Description
Summary
`bodyLimit()` does not reliably enforce `maxSize` for requests without a usable `Content-Length` (e.g. `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`). Oversized requests can reach handlers and return `200` instead of `413`.
Details
For chunked / unknown-length requests, `bodyLimit()` wraps the body in a stream that counts bytes asynchronously, then runs the handler before the size decision is final. The `413` is only applied afterwards by checking `c.error`.
This lets the limit be bypassed when:
• the handler does not read the body,
• the handler reads only the first chunk(s) and returns, or
• the handler reads the body but swallows the read error in `try/catch`.
In all three cases the handler returns `200` before the limit check completes (or its result is observed).
The fix is to enforce the size decision before `next()` runs, instead of retrofitting the response via `c.error` afterwards.
Impact
Applications relying on `bodyLimit()` as a hard boundary can be bypassed: oversized chunked requests can reach handler logic and return successful responses. Per-request data exposure is bounded by `maxSize`, but the documented guarantee — "oversized requests are rejected before business logic runs" — does not hold.
Credits
• @lalalala5678 (slow chunked / early return variants)
• @Jvr2022 (error handling bypass)
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-44456 Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption weakness