GHSA-c37p-4qqg-3p76 OpenClaw Twilio voice-call webhook auth bypass when ngrok loopback compatibility is enabled

• npm openclaw: < 2026.2.14 → fixed in 2026.2.14

Summary A Twilio webhook signature-verification bypass in the voice-call extension could allow unauthenticated webhook requests when a specific ngrok free-tier compatibility option is enabled. Impact This issue is limited to configurations that explicitly enable and expose the voice-call webhook endpoint. Not affected by default: • The voice-call extension is optional and disabled by default. • The bypass only applied when `tunnel.allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass` was explicitly enabled. • Exploitation required the webhook to be reachable (typically via a public ngrok URL during development). Worst case (when exposed and the option was enabled): • An external attacker could send forged requests to the publicly reachable webhook endpoint that would be accepted without a valid `X-Twilio-Signature`. • This could result in unauthorized webhook event handling (integrity) and request flooding (availability). Affected Packages / Versions • Package: `openclaw` (npm) • Affected versions: `= 2026.2.14` (planned next release; pending publish) Fix `allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass` no longer bypasses signature verification. It only enables trusting forwarded headers on loopback so the public ngrok URL can be reconstructed for correct signature validation. Fix commit(s): • ff11d8793b90c52f8d84dae3fbb99307da51b5c9 Thanks @p80n-sec for reporting.