GHSA-c54g-xjwj-8g82 Hugo: XSS via text/html content files

• Go github.com/gohugoio/hugo: < 0.162.0 → fixed in 0.162.0

Commit: e41a06447d — _Disallow HTML content by default_ Affected versions: all Hugo versions prior to v0.162.0. Fixed in: v0.162.0. Severity: Low to Medium, depending on threat model. Not an issue if you fully trust every file under `/content` and every content adapter you load. Description. Hugo accepts content files in several markup formats. Files mapped to the `text/html` media type (typically `.html` files under `/content`, or pages produced by a content adapter that sets `content.mediaType = "text/html"`) had their body emitted verbatim into the rendered page. A site that ingests HTML content from an untrusted source — for example, a CMS-backed editor, a content adapter pulling from an external API, or an automated import pipeline — could therefore be served stored cross-site scripting. Mitigation. v0.162.0 introduces a `security.allowContent` whitelist with `text/html` denied by default. Sites that intentionally author HTML content can opt back in: ```toml [security] allowContent = ['.*'] ``` This only affects pages whose source file (or content adapter output) declares an HTML media type; Markdown, AsciiDoc, Org, Pandoc and reStructuredText content is unaffected.