GHSA-c59p-wq67-24wx Infinite loop and Blind SSRF found inside the Webfinger mechanism in @fedify/fedify

• npm @fedify/fedify: >= 1.0.13, < 1.0.14 → fixed in 1.0.14 • npm @fedify/fedify: >= 1.1.10, < 1.1.11 → fixed in 1.1.11 • npm @fedify/fedify: >= 1.2.10, < 1.2.11 → fixed in 1.2.11 • npm @fedify/fedify: >= 1.3.3, < 1.3.4 → fixed in 1.3.4

Summary This vulnerability allows a user to maneuver the Webfinger mechanism to perform a GET request to any internal resource on any Host, Port, URL combination regardless of present security mechanisms, and forcing the victim’s server into an infinite loop causing Denial of Service. Moreover, this issue can also be maneuvered into performing a Blind SSRF attack. Details The Webfinger endpoint takes a remote domain for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per the ActivityPub spec (https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-considerations), on the security considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while running in production. The lookupWebFinger function, responsible for returning an actor handler for received actor objects from a remote server, can be abused to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) and Blind SSRF attacks while attempting to resolve a malicious actor’s object. On Fedify, two client-facing functions implement the lookupWebFinger function- getActorHandle, and lookupObject, which are both used as a wrapper for the vulnerable lookup function. As the lookupObject function is implemented only for CLI usage, we won’t focus our PoC and explanation on it, but it is still vulnerable in the same way getActorHandle is. The getActorHandle function is a wrapper function for the getActorHandleInternal function (both present at _/src/vocab/actor.ts_): ```javascript async function getActorHandleInternal( actor: Actor | URL, options: GetActorHandleOptions = {}, ): Promise { const actorId = actor instanceof URL ? actor : actor.id; if (actorId != null) { const result = await lookupWebFinger(actorId, { userAgent: options.userAgent, tracerProvider: options.tracerProvider, }); if (result != null) { const aliases = [...(result.aliases ?? [])]; if (result.subject != null) aliases.unshift(result.subject); for (const alias of aliases) { const match = alias.match(/^acct:([^@]+)@([^@]+)$/); if (match != null) { const hostname = new URL(`https://${match[2]}/`).hostname; if ( hostname !== actorId.hostname && !await verifyCrossOriginActorHandle( actorId.href, alias, options.userAgent, options.tracerProvider, ) ) { continue; } return normalizeActorHandle(`@${match[1]}@${match[2]}`, options); } } } } if ( !(actor instanceof URL) && actor.preferredUsername != null && actor.id != null ) { return normalizeActorHandle( `@${actor.preferredUsername}@${actor.id.host}`, options, ); } throw new TypeError( "Actor does not have enough information to get the handle.", ); } ``` The actorId parameter containing a URL of the actor ID sinks into the lookupWebFinger function which is a wrapper for the lookupWebFingerInternal: ```javascript async function lookupWebFingerInternal( resource: URL | string, options: LookupWebFingerOptions = {}, ): Promise { if (typeof resource === "string") resource = new URL(resource); let protocol = "https:"; let server: string; if (resource.protocol === "acct:") { const atPos = resource.pathname.lastIndexOf("@"); if (atPos = 300 && response.status status code>400). This custom redirect implementation contains multiple issues: 1.The redirect loop is endless ( while(true) loop ) without any iteration limiting, allowing attackers to perform DoS via endless redirecting. 2. A Blind SSRF attack to any URL, with arbitrary Host, Port and Path is possible via the current custom redirect implementation. 3. As the redirect handler is a custom one, it breaches the security mechanisms presented by the native redirect handler of fetch - allowing the attacker to redirect to different schemes such as data or file schemes. In order to successfully perform any of the attacks described above, an attacker needs to create a federated app which presents a malicious actor object, containing an actor ID URL of a second server which performs a recursive redirect to itself, or a URL containing an internal resource. PoC 1. In order to show a use case of the vulnerability, we can use the demo app presented at this URL: https://github.com/dahlia/microblog. 2. We will create two machines, victim and attacker, each one on a different server with different domains. _Victim Machine_ 1. Create a new instance (we tested on ubuntu’s latest version), and update the package manager. 2. Install a Deno server: ` curl -fsSL https://deno.land/install.sh | sh ` ` source ~/.bashrc ` ` deno --version #check deno is working ` 3. Pull the git repository of the victim blog app: ` git clone https://github.com/dahlia/fedify.git ` 4. Modify the federation object to remove signature checks for the sake of easy testing: On file _/examples/blog/federation/mod.ts_ edit the _createFederation_ object the following attribute: _skipSignatureVerification: true_. 5. Change into the blog app directory ( /examples/blog ) and run the app: ` deno task preview ` 6. Surf to the application on the browser, and register a user on the app. _Attacker Machine_ 1. Create a new instance (we tested on ubuntu’s latest version), and update the package manager. 2. Install NVM in order to install the latest version of NPM and NODEJS (and source current shell to check it worked): ` curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.…