GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Maven

GHSA-c7jm-38gq-h67h http4k: `ServerFilters.DigestAuth` / `DigestAuthProvider` defaulted to an always-true nonce verifier, disabling replay protection in default deployments

MEDIUM Published 2026-06-19 Modified 2026-06-19 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
Maven
Packages
org.http4k:http4k-security-digest
Severity
Moderate
Weaknesses
CWE-294
Reviewed
2026-06-19

Affected packages

• Maven org.http4k:http4k-security-digest: >= 6.0.0.0, < 6.48.0.0 → fixed in 6.48.0.0 • Maven org.http4k:http4k-security-digest: >= 5.0.0.0, < 5.42.0.0 → fixed in 5.42.0.0 • Maven org.http4k:http4k-security-digest: < 4.51.0.0 → fixed in 4.51.0.0

Description

Impact `ServerFilters.DigestAuth` and the underlying `DigestAuthProvider` both defaulted their `nonceVerifier` parameter to `{ true }` — i.e. every nonce was accepted regardless of value, age, or prior use. Any deployment using the default configuration had no replay protection on Digest authentication; a captured `Authorization: Digest …` response could be replayed indefinitely against the same protected resource. The nonce-verification mechanism in Digest auth is the primary anti-replay control — without it, Digest reduces to a credential bound only to a stale nonce string. Who is affected: any application using `ServerFilters.DigestAuth` or `DigestAuthProvider` with the default `nonceVerifier`. The broken default has been present since `DigestAuthProvider` was introduced (2021). Exploitation requires the attacker to first capture a valid Digest response (network observation, log access, etc.) — non-trivial in modern TLS deployments but not impossible. Anyone running Digest auth with default config should treat upgrade as urgent. Patches | Line | Fixed in | Edition | |------|----------|---------| | v6.x (Community) | 6.48.0.0 | Community | | v5.x (LTS) | 5.42.0.0 | Enterprise — contact [email protected] (if Digest auth is present in your v5.x line) | | v4.x (LTS) | 4.51.0.0 | Enterprise — contact [email protected] (if Digest auth is present in your v4.x line) | The fix (`[Break]`) removes the default value for `nonceVerifier` from both `ServerFilters.DigestAuth` and `DigestAuthProvider`. Callers must now supply a real verifier explicitly — the broken default cannot be silently inherited. Workarounds For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately: explicitly supply a `nonceVerifier` that tracks issued nonces, enforces a TTL, and rejects re-use. Do not rely on the default.

Related

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay weakness

References