GitHub Advisoryadvisory · RubyGems, npm

GHSA-f78j-4w3g-4q65 StimulusReflex arbitrary method call

HIGH Published 2024-03-12 Modified 2024-09-25 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2024-28121
Ecosystem
RubyGems, npm
Packages
stimulus_reflex
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-470
Reviewed
2024-03-12

Affected packages

• RubyGems stimulus_reflex: >= 3.5.0.pre0, < 3.5.0.rc4 → fixed in 3.5.0.rc4 • RubyGems stimulus_reflex: < 3.4.2 → fixed in 3.4.2 • npm stimulus_reflex: >= 3.5.0-pre0, < 3.5.0-rc4 → fixed in 3.5.0-rc4 • npm stimulus_reflex: < 3.4.2 → fixed in 3.4.2

Description

Summary More methods than expected can be called on reflex instances. Being able to call some of them has security implications. Details To invoke a reflex a websocket message of the following shape is sent: ```json { "target": "[class_name]#[method_name]", "args": [] } ``` The server will proceed to instantiate `reflex` using the provided `class_name` as long as it extends `StimulusReflex::Reflex`. It then attempts to call `method_name` on the instance with the provided arguments ref: ```ruby method = reflex.method method_name required_params = method.parameters.select { |(kind, _)| kind == :req } optional_params = method.parameters.select { |(kind, _)| kind == :opt } if arguments.size >= required_params.size && arguments.size Read more Let's imagine a reflex that uses `@user` as a trusted variable in an `after_reflex` callback. This variable can be overwritten using the following message: ```json { "target": "ChatReflex#instance_variable_set", "args": ["@user", ""] } ``` Here are other interesting methods that were found to be available for the ChatReflex sample reflex • `remote_byebug`: bind a debugging server • `pry`: drop the process in a REPL session All in all, only counting `:req` and `:opt` parameters helps. For example around version 1.0 only `.arity` was checked which allowed access to the `system` method (`.arity == -1`) ```json { "target": "ChatReflex#system", "args": ["[command here]"] } ``` Using `public_send` instead of `send` does not help but the following payloads do not work since `:rest` parameters are not counted in the current version ```json { "target": "ChatReflex#send", "args": ["system", "[command here]"] } ``` ```json { "target": "ChatReflex#instance_eval", "args": ["system('[command here]')"] } ``` Pre-versions of 3.5.0 added a `render_collection` method on reflexes with a `:req` parameter. Calling this method could lead to arbitrary code execution: ```json { "target": "StimulusReflex::Reflex#render_collection", "args": [ { "inline": "" } ] } ``` Patches Patches are available on RubyGems and on NPM. The patched versions are: • `3.4.2` • `3.5.0.rc4` Workaround You can add this guard to mitigate the issue if running an unpatched version of the library. 1.) Make sure all your reflexes inherit from the `ApplicationReflex` class 2.) Add this `before_reflex` callback to your `app/reflexes/application_reflex.rb` file: ```ruby class ApplicationReflex < StimulusReflex::Reflex before_reflex do ancestors = self.class.ancestors[0..self.class.ancestors.index(StimulusReflex::Reflex) - 1] allowed = ancestors.any? { |a| a.public_instance_methods(false).any?(method_name.to_sym) } raise ArgumentError.new("Reflex method '#{method_name}' is not defined on class '#{self.class.name}' or on any of its ancestors") if !allowed end end ```

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2024-28121 stimulus_reflex is a system to extend the capabilities of both Rails and Stimulus by intercepting user interactions and passing them to… vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code weakness

References