GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-f794-5jv7-7672 NLTK: Downloader.download follows hardlinks and overwrites outside-root files

MEDIUM Published 2026-09-02 Modified 2026-09-02 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-81727
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
nltk
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-59, CWE-61, CWE-73
Reviewed
2026-09-02

Affected packages

• PyPI nltk: < 3.10.3 → fixed in 3.10.3

Description

Summary NLTK's downloader now blocks symlink escapes during ZIP extraction, but it still treats pre-existing hardlinks inside the install tree as ordinary in-root files. A normal package install can therefore overwrite an outside-root inode through that hardlink. Details • Vulnerability type: Filesystem containment bypass • Affected component: `nltk.downloader.Downloader.download`, `nltk.downloader.Downloader.incr_download` • Affected versions: Published `3.9.4` and current source `v3.10.0-rc2` both reproduced for the extraction-stage overwrite. • Patched versions: 3.10.3 • Root cause: The downloader validates traversal and symlink conditions but does not reject pre-existing hardlink aliases inside the install tree. The install flow correctly rejects a pre-existing symlink at an extraction target, yet it accepts a pre-existing hardlink at the same path. When the package is installed, extracted member data is written through the hardlink and mutates the outside inode. PoC Preconditions • The attacker can plant files inside a writable shared downloader root on the same filesystem as the target file. Steps 1. Prepare a downloader root and create a hardlink inside it that points to an outside target file. 2. Confirm a symlink at the same path is rejected as a negative control. 3. Run a normal `Downloader.download()` package install whose extracted member lands on the hardlink path. 4. Observe the outside target file is overwritten while the downloader still reports the package as installed. Minimal reproducible excerpt ```text extract_hardlink_before ORIGINAL extract_hardlink_after PWNED extract_hardlink_status installed ``` Impact A shared or attacker-influenced downloader directory can be turned into an overwrite primitive against same-filesystem files outside the intended install root. Remediation Treat pre-existing hardlinks as unsafe in extraction targets, verify that each write path stays within the intended install tree at the inode level, and add regression tests that pair hardlinks with existing symlink controls.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-81727 NLTK versions before 3.10.3 contain a filesystem containment bypass vulnerability in the Downloader.download and Downloader.incr_download… vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (3)

  • CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access weakness
  • CWE-61 UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following weakness
  • CWE-73 External Control of File Name or Path weakness

References