GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-ffpj-xv5c-p3gw Open WebUI: ReDoS in skill-mention regexes causes whole-instance DoS on default config
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-59220
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- open-webui
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-1333
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-24
Affected packages
• PyPI open-webui: >= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0 → fixed in 0.10.0
Description
Summary
Two regexes in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` that parse `` skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains ``. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on every chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
Affected versions
`>= 0.9.2, ]+)\|?[^>]*>')
line 2247 — used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662)
strip_re = re.compile(r']+\|?([^>]*)>')
```
`extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls.
Root cause
`[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` — O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input.
Proof of concept
Standalone (no Open WebUI required):
```python
import re, time
EXTRACT = re.compile(r']+)\|?[^>]*>')
STRIP = re.compile(r']+\|?([^>]*)>')
for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000):
s = '6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms')
```
Time quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one.
End-to-end against a live instance (default config):
1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults.
2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup).
3. Send a chat message containing ``.
4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed.
Patch
Rewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed ``, ``, and bare `` mentions.
```python
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r']+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>')
strip_re = re.compile(r']+(?:\|([^>]*))?>')
```
After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0.
Credit
Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-59220 Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity weakness
References
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-ffpj-xv5c-p3gw web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59220 advisory
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/61a26722155ec6ee1b629cf8dfcf975098c18331 web
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui package
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0 web