GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI

GHSA-ffpj-xv5c-p3gw Open WebUI: ReDoS in skill-mention regexes causes whole-instance DoS on default config

MEDIUM Published 2026-07-24 Modified 2026-07-24 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-59220
Ecosystem
PyPI
Packages
open-webui
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-1333
Reviewed
2026-07-24

Affected packages

• PyPI open-webui: >= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0 → fixed in 0.10.0

Description

Summary Two regexes in `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py` that parse `` skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains ``. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on every chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside `re` and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern. Affected versions `>= 0.9.2, ]+)\|?[^>]*>') line 2247 — used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662) strip_re = re.compile(r']+\|?([^>]*)>') ``` `extract_skill_ids_from_messages()` runs before the `if all_skill_ids:` block (that guard gates only skill *injection*, not the regex), and `strip_skill_mentions()` runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async `process_chat_payload` coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default `UVICORN_WORKERS=1` (`backend/start.sh`) the whole instance stalls. Root cause `[^|>]` is a subset of `[^>]`, so the quantifier pair `[^|>]+ \|? [^>]*` is ambiguous: on input that never closes with `>`, `[^|>]+` greedily consumes the tail, `>` fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between `[^|>]+` and `[^>]*` — O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input. Proof of concept Standalone (no Open WebUI required): ```python import re, time EXTRACT = re.compile(r']+)\|?[^>]*>') STRIP = re.compile(r']+\|?([^>]*)>') for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000): s = '6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms') ``` Time quadruples per doubling of `n` (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one. End-to-end against a live instance (default config): 1. `docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6` on defaults. 2. Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup). 3. Send a chat message containing ``. 4. One CPU core pegs in `re`; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed. Patch Rewrite the optional `|label` as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed ``, ``, and bare `` mentions. ```python SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r']+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>') strip_re = re.compile(r']+(?:\|([^>]*))?>') ``` After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0. Credit Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-59220 Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity weakness

References