GHSA-fgmr-7w36-9qfq SiYuan: Static-file routes bypass the publish-access controls enforced on the REST API, exposing templates, snippets and export artifacts to anonymous readers

• Go github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel: < 0.0.0-20260725122641-34be6c0bb073 → fixed in 0.0.0-20260725122641-34be6c0bb073

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72796. Summary Several static-file routes in the server mux (`kernel/server/serve.go`) are registered with `CheckAuth` only and serve directories directly, without the publish-access checks, sensitive-path blocklist, or `refuseToAccess` rules that the REST API applies to the same data. They are therefore reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Most notably, `/templates/` serves `data/templates` a directory the REST file API explicitly refuses to serve to non-administrators. Details | Route | Registration | Guard | Exposed to a reader | |---|---|---|---| | `/templates/*` (line 424) | `Group("/templates/", model.CheckAuth).Static("", data/templates)` | none beyond path cleaning | the templates directory | | `/snippets/*` (line 434) | `CheckAuth` | blocks only `conf.json` | any snippet's JS/CSS content by name | | `/widgets/`, `/plugins/`, `/emojis/` (409/414/419) | `Group(CheckAuth).Static(dir)` | none | whole directory trees | | `/export/*` (line 320) | `Group("/export/", CheckAuth)` | traversal, sensitive-path and DEK guards: no publish check | export artifacts (PDF/HTML/DOCX/CSV) | `/templates/` directly contradicts an existing control. The REST file path runs `refuseToAccess` (`kernel/api/file.go:551-553`), which explicitly returns 403 for `data/templates/` to non-administrators the project has already decided readers must not read templates. The `/templates/` static route serves that same directory to any `RoleReader`, with no `IsSensitivePath` check, no publish-access check, and no `refuseToAccess`. Templates are user-authored Markdown documents containing template/Sprig syntax and are not covered by publish-access controls. `gin`'s `.Static` disables directory listing, so a filename is required but the contradiction with `refuseToAccess` is the defect. `/export/` versus `/assets/`. `/assets/*path` (line 692) correctly gates non-administrators via `CheckAbsPathAccessableByPublishAccess`, plus `IsSensitivePath` and encrypted-asset handling. `/export/` carries traversal, sensitive-path and DEK guards but no publish-access check, so a reader can retrieve export artifacts of arbitrary documents, including private ones. Artifact naming is mixed, some use a random export ID, but code and CSV exports use the document name (`export/code/`, `export/csv//.csv`), which a reader can derive from `listDocsByPath` titles while the artifact exists. This path is therefore conditional. Confirmed correctly gated, for contrast: `/assets/*` (publish-gated), `/history/*` and `/repo/diff/*` (`CheckAdminRole`), `/debug/pprof/*` (disabled in production builds), `/public/` (intentionally public). All four routes above were verified to carry `CheckAuth` only, no `CheckReadonly`, no `CheckAdminRole`. Proof of Concept Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808), anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. Templates: served despite the REST API refusing them: ``` GET http://127.0.0.1:6808/templates/.md → 200, template content ``` The equivalent REST request is refused: ``` POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/file/getFile {"path":"data/templates/.md"} → 403 (refuseToAccess) ``` The same reader session obtains the file through the static route. Snippets: ``` GET http://127.0.0.1:6808/snippets/.js → 200, snippet source ``` Export artifacts (conditional on a predictable name while the artifact exists): ``` GET http://127.0.0.1:6808/export/csv//.csv → 200, exported content of a document the reader has no publish access to ``` Impact An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read user-authored template documents that the REST API explicitly withholds from non-administrators, snippet source (JS/CSS), and the contents of the widgets, plugins and emoji directories. Where an export artifact exists under a derivable name, they can additionally retrieve exported content of documents outside their publish scope. Confidentiality-only. Suggested fix Apply the same treatment these routes' REST counterparts already receive: for non-administrator roles, enforce publish-access scoping plus `IsSensitivePath` and the `refuseToAccess` blocklist on the static routes, mirroring `/assets/*`. Alternatively, block `/templates/`, non-public `/snippets/`, and `/export/` for reader roles entirely.