GHSA-fvmw-cj7j-j39q Astro Cloudflare adapter has Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in /_image endpoint

• npm astro: < 5.15.9 → fixed in 5.15.9

Summary A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the @astrojs/cloudflare adapter with `output: 'server'`. The built-in image optimization endpoint (`/_image`) uses `isRemoteAllowed()` from Astro’s internal helpers, which unconditionally allows `data:` URLs. When the endpoint receives a valid `data:` URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a 302 redirect back to the original `data:` URL, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (`image.domains` / `image.remotePatterns`) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations. Affected Versions • `@astrojs/cloudflare` ≤ 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions) • Astro ≥ 4.x when used with `output: 'server'` and the Cloudflare adapter Root Cause – Vulnerable Code File: `node_modules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts` ```ts export function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean { if (!URL.canParse(src)) { return false; } const url = new URL(src); // Data URLs are always allowed if (url.protocol === 'data:') { return true; } // Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) { return false; } // ... further http/https allow-list checks } ``` In the Cloudflare adapter, the `/_image` endpoint contains logic similar to: ```ts const href = ctx.url.searchParams.get('href'); if (!href) { // return error } if (isRemotePath(href)) { if (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) { // return error } else { //redirect to return the image return Response.redirect(href, 302); } } ``` Because `data:` URLs are considered “allowed”, a request such as: `https://example.com/_image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)` triggers a 302 redirect directly to the `data:` URL, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG. Proof of Concept (PoC) 1. Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (`output: 'server'`). 2. Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers. 3. Request the image endpoint with the following payload: ``` https://yoursite.com/_image?href= ``` (Base64 decodes to: `alert('zomasec')`) 4. The endpoint returns a 302 redirect to the `data:` URL → browser executes the `` → `alert()` fires. Impact • Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage) • Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.) • Account takeover when combined with CSRF • Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers • Bypasses `image.domains` / `image.remotePatterns` configuration entirely Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior Other Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically proxy and rasterize SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The Cloudflare adapter currently redirects to remote resources (including `data:` URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable. References • Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts • Similar `data:` URL bypass in WordPress: CVE-2025-2575