GHSA-g2pf-ww5m-2r9m Zitadel is missing enforcement of organization scopes

• Go github.com/zitadel/zitadel: >= 4.0.0-rc.1, < 4.12.3 → fixed in 4.12.3 • Go github.com/zitadel/zitadel: >= 3.0.0-rc.1, < 3.4.9 → fixed in 3.4.9 • Go github.com/zitadel/zitadel: < 1.80.0-v2.20.0.20260317120401-d90285929ca0 → fixed in 1.80.0-v2.20.0.20260317120401-d90285929ca0

Summary A vulnerability in Zitadel's OAuth2/OIDC interface, which allowed users to bypass organization enforcement during authentication. Impact Zitadel allows applications to enforce an organzation context during authentication using scopes (`urn:zitadel:iam:org:id:{id}` and `urn:zitadel:iam:org:domain:primary:{domainname}`). If enforced, a user needs to be part of the required organization to sign in. While this was properly enforced for OAuth2/OIDC authorization requests in login V1, corresponding controls were missing for device authorization requests and all login V2 and OIDC API V2 endpoints. This allowed users to bypass the restriction and sign in with users from other organizations. Note that this enforcement allows for an additional check during authentication and applications relying on authorizations / roles assignments are not affected by this bypass. Affected Versions Systems running one of the following versions are affected: • 4.x: `4.0.0` through `4.12.2` (including RC versions) • 3.x: `3.0.0` through `3.4.8` (including RC versions) Patches The vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. The patch resolves the issue by validating the provided scopes and enforcing the organization existence when processing the authorization request. Additionally it will prevent the use of a session of a user which does not belong to the required organization on the OIDC service endpoints (CreateCallback and Authorize or Deny Device Authorization endpoints). 4.x: Upgrade to >=4.12.3 3.x: Update to >=3.4.9 Workarounds The recommended solution is to upgrade to a patched version. Questions If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [email protected] Credits Thanks to @motoki317 for reporting this vulnerability.