GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-g7r4-m6w7-qqqr esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows
LOW
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- esbuild
- Severity
- Low
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-22
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-12
Affected packages
• npm esbuild: >= 0.27.3, < 0.28.1 → fixed in 0.28.1
Description
Summary
The development server contains a path traversal vulnerability on Windows when serving files from `servedir`.
Due to the use of `path.Clean()` (which only normalizes forward-slash `/` separators) instead of a Windows-aware path normalization function, it is possible to craft requests using backslashes (`\`) that bypass the intended directory containment logic. An attacker can escape the configured `servedir` root and access arbitrary files on the filesystem.
This issue affects Windows environments only.
Details
The request path is sanitized using:
```go
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
```
However:
• `path.Clean()` is POSIX-style and only understands `/` (docs: `https://pkg.go.dev/path#Clean`)
• On Windows, `\` is a valid path separator
• `path.Clean()` does not treat `\` as a separator
Later, the server constructs the absolute path:
```go
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L221
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
```
If `queryPath` contains sequences such as:
```
..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini
```
`path.Clean()` will not normalize them, but the Windows filesystem will interpret `\` as directory separators when resolving `absPath`.
Because the implementation does not verify that the final resolved path remains within `servedir`, it allows directory traversal outside the intended root directory.
Vulnerable Code
```go
// https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/v0.27.3/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L165
queryPath := path.Clean(req.URL.Path)[1:]
....
// Check for a file in the "servedir" directory
if h.servedir != "" && kind != fs.FileEntry {
absPath := h.fs.Join(h.servedir, queryPath)
if absDir := h.fs.Dir(absPath); absDir != absPath {
if entries, err, _ := h.fs.ReadDirectory(absDir); err == nil {
if entry, _ := entries.Get(h.fs.Base(absPath)); entry != nil && entry.Kind(h.fs) == fs.FileEntry {
....
```
Steps to reproduce
```
npm install --save-exact --save-dev esbuild
echo "console.log(1)" > app.js
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild --version
0.27.3
.\node_modules\.bin\esbuild app.js --bundle --outdir=www --servedir=www --watch
curl -i --path-as-is "http://localhost:8000/..\..\..\..\..\..\..\Windows\system.ini"
```
Impact
• Arbitrary file read on Windows
• Exposure of sensitive files
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory weakness