GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-gcj7-r3hg-m7w6 OpenClaw's voice-call Twilio replay dedupe now bound to authenticated webhook identity

LOW Published 2026-03-03 Modified 2026-03-03 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
openclaw
Severity
Low
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Weaknesses
CWE-294, CWE-345
Reviewed
2026-03-03

Affected packages

• npm openclaw: < 2026.2.26 → fixed in 2026.2.26

Description

Summary The voice-call Twilio webhook path accepted replay/dedupe identity from unsigned request metadata (`i-twilio-idempotency-token`), enabling replayed signed requests to bypass replay detection and manager dedupe by mutating only that header. Affected Packages / Versions • Package: `openclaw` (npm) • Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.25` (latest published npm version at triage time) • Fixed on `main`: commit `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4` • Planned patched npm version: `2026.2.26` Impact Deployments using the optional `voice-call` Twilio webhook path could accept replayed webhook events as fresh events when an attacker had one valid signed request and changed only the unsigned idempotency header. Technical Details The fix removes unsigned-header trust from Twilio replay/dedupe identity and binds replay/manager dedupe to authenticated request material. It also threads a verified request identity through provider parsing so dedupe uses verification-derived identity rather than mutable headers. Fix Commit(s) • `1aadf26f9acc399affabd859937a09468a9c5cb4` Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.26`). After the npm release is published, this advisory can be published without additional version-field edits. OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Related

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay weakness
  • CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity weakness

References