GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm

GHSA-gg6h-894w-4m9c RE2JS: Quadratic-time denial of service in re2js lookbehind matching

HIGH Published 2026-10-28 Modified 2026-10-28 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-116795
Ecosystem
npm
Packages
re2js
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-1333, CWE-407
Reviewed
2026-10-28

Affected packages

• npm re2js: >= 2.2.0, < 2.8.7 → fixed in 2.8.7

Description

Summary Using the opt-in `LOOKBEHINDS` flag together with any repeated-matching API (`matcher().find()` in a loop, `matchAll()`, `split()`, `matcher().replaceAll()`) causes quadratic-time (Θ(n²)) matching, contradicting the library's own "linear time matching" guarantee. A single call with a 16,000-character input takes 36.7–38.7 seconds of CPU. Description Root cause In `build/index.cjs`, `Machine.match`: ```js let currentPos = this.prog.numLb > 0 ? 0 : pos; // ~line 1907 ... if (this.ncap === 0 && this.matched) break; // ~line 1953 ``` Any pattern containing a lookbehind sets `prog.numLb > 0`, which forces the scan to always restart at offset 0, regardless of the requested start position — the lookbehind automaton is re-seeded and the whole input is re-walked on every single `find()` call. The early-exit optimization that would otherwise stop at the first match only fires when `ncap === 0`, but every `Matcher`-based API (`find`/`matchAll`/`split`/`replaceAll`) always requests `ncap = 2` (one capture group slot) even for a captureless lookbehind pattern — so the early exit never triggers through those APIs, and the scan continues to the end of the input on every find. A find-loop over *k* matches in an *n*-character string therefore costs *k* × Θ(*n*); for dense matches *k* ∝ *n*, giving Θ(n²) total. Isolating control Identical find-loop, identical input sizes, same 2-character literal pattern *shape* — but without the `LOOKBEHINDS` flag: | n | with `LOOKBEHINDS` (lookbehind pattern) | without (plain literal) | native JS `RegExp` lookbehind | |---|---|---|---| | 2,000 | 204–228 ms | 3 ms | 0 ms | | 4,000 | 877–899 ms | 4 ms | 0 ms | | 8,000 | 5,746–6,599 ms | 7 ms | 1 ms | | 16,000 | 36,667–38,732 ms | 6 ms | 1 ms | This isolates the lookbehind machinery itself — not pattern length, not match density in the abstract — as the exact and sole cause. Impact • `re2js`'s entire value proposition is being an RE2-style engine with linear-time, no-backtracking matching, specifically to resist algorithmic-complexity attacks that plague backtracking regex engines. This finding defeats that guarantee for any consumer using the advertised `LOOKBEHINDS` feature. • Realistic affected code paths: log/text processing that tokenizes or redacts using a lookbehind-based pattern (`matchAll`, `split`, `replaceAll` are the natural APIs for exactly this), applied to attacker-influenced text (user input, uploaded logs, scraped content). • A single ~16–32 KB request pins a CPU core for tens of seconds to minutes; Node.js being single-threaded, this freezes the whole worker process for the duration. No authentication or special pattern knowledge is required from the attacker — ordinary alternating text (`"abababab..."`) triggers it. Reproduction (copy-paste runnable) create file poc.js ```js 'use strict'; // PoC: quadratic-time DoS in re2js's lookbehind matching (opt-in LOOKBEHINDS flag). // Usage: // npm pack [email protected] --ignore-scripts && tar -xzf re2js-2.8.6.tgz // node poc.js ./package const path = require('path'); const pkgDir = process.argv[2] || './package'; const { RE2JS } = require(path.resolve(pkgDir, 'build/index.cjs')); const re = RE2JS.compile('(? linear, ~4 => quadratic)'); console.log(ratio > 3 ? 'PASS quadratic scaling confirmed on the REAL published package' : 'FAIL scaling looks linear'); process.exit(ratio > 3 ? 0 : 1); ``` and run in terminal ```sh npm pack [email protected] --ignore-scripts tar -xzf re2js-2.8.6.tgz node poc.js ./package ``` `poc.js` times a `matcher(s).find()` loop over `(?<=a)b` + `RE2JS.LOOKBEHINDS` on inputs of 2,000/4,000/8,000/16,000 chars and reports the doubling ratio. Expected: clearly superlinear (ratio ≫ 2, approaching or exceeding the 4× quadratic signature), reaching tens of seconds at 16,000 chars. Run twice; results are deterministic.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-116795 RE2JS is the JavaScript port of RE2, a regular expression engine that provides linear time matching. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity weakness
  • CWE-407 Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity weakness

References