GitHub Advisoryadvisory · npm
GHSA-ggxq-hp9w-j794 Astro's middleware authentication checks based on url.pathname can be bypassed via url encoded values
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2025-64765
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Packages
- astro
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-22
- Reviewed
- 2025-11-19
Affected packages
• npm astro: < 5.15.8 → fixed in 5.15.8
Description
A mismatch exists between how Astro normalizes request paths for routing/rendering and how the application’s middleware reads the path for validation checks. Astro internally applies `decodeURI()` to determine which route to render, while the middleware uses `context.url.pathname` without applying the same normalization (decodeURI).
This discrepancy may allow attackers to reach protected routes (e.g., /admin) using encoded path variants that pass routing but bypass validation checks.
https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/ebc4b1cde82c76076d5d673b5b70f94be2c066f3/packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-astro-server/request.ts#L40-L44
```js
/** The main logic to route dev server requests to pages in Astro. */
export async function handleRequest({
pipeline,
routesList,
controller,
incomingRequest,
incomingResponse,
}: HandleRequest) {
const { config, loader } = pipeline;
const origin = `${loader.isHttps() ? 'https' : 'http'}://${
incomingRequest.headers[':authority'] ?? incomingRequest.headers.host
}`;
const url = new URL(origin + incomingRequest.url);
let pathname: string;
if (config.trailingSlash === 'never' && !incomingRequest.url) {
pathname = '';
} else {
// We already have a middleware that checks if there's an incoming URL that has invalid URI, so it's safe
// to not handle the error: packages/astro/src/vite-plugin-astro-server/base.ts
pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname); // here this url is for routing/rendering
}
// Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR
url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname; // this is used for middleware context
```
Consider an application having the following middleware code:
```js
import { defineMiddleware } from "astro/middleware";
export const onRequest = defineMiddleware(async (context, next) => {
const isAuthed = false; // simulate no auth
if (context.url.pathname === "/admin" && !isAuthed) {
return context.redirect("/");
}
return next();
});
```
`context.url.pathname` is validated , if it's equal to `/admin` the `isAuthed` property must be true for the next() method to be called. The same example can be found in the official docs https://docs.astro.build/en/guides/authentication/
`context.url.pathname` returns the raw version which is `/%61admin` while pathname which is used for routing/rendering `/admin`, this creates a path normalization mismatch.
By sending the following request, it's possible to bypass the middleware check
```
GET /%61dmin HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
```
Remediation
Ensure middleware context has the same normalized pathname value that Astro uses internally, because any difference could allow it to bypass such checks. In short maybe something like this
```diff
pathname = decodeURI(url.pathname);
}
// Add config.base back to url before passing it to SSR
• url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + url.pathname;
+ url.pathname = removeTrailingForwardSlash(config.base) + decodeURI(url.pathname);
```
Thank you, let @Sudistark know if any more info is needed. Happy to help :)
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2025-64765 Astro is a web framework. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory weakness