GitHub Advisoryadvisory · GitHub Actions
GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-275)
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2023-52137
- Ecosystem
- GitHub Actions
- Packages
- tj-actions/verify-changed-files
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-20, CWE-77
- Reviewed
- 2024-01-02
Affected packages
• GitHub Actions tj-actions/verify-changed-files: < 17 → fixed in 17
Description
Summary
The `tj-actions/verify-changed-files` action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The `verify-changed-files` workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.
Proof of Concept
1. Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` would be a valid filename.
2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files tracked and untracked files` step.
```yaml
• name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
run: |
echo "Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}"
```
Example output:
```yaml
[group]Run echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt"
echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt"[0m
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
[endgroup]
Changed files: runner.txt
```
Impact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
• A new `safe_output` input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.
• A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
```yaml
• name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
env:
CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}
run: |
echo "Changed files: $CHANGED_FILES"
```
Resources
• Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input
• Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2023-52137 The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed… vulnerability
References
- https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52137 advisory
- https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/498d3f316f501aa72485060e8c96fde7b2014f12 web
- https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/592e305da041c09a009afa4a43c97d889bed65c3 web
- https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files package