GitHub Advisoryadvisory · GitHub Actions

GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-275)

HIGH Published 2024-01-02 Modified 2024-01-02 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2023-52137
Ecosystem
GitHub Actions
Packages
tj-actions/verify-changed-files
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
Weaknesses
CWE-20, CWE-77
Reviewed
2024-01-02

Affected packages

• GitHub Actions tj-actions/verify-changed-files: < 17 → fixed in 17

Description

Summary The `tj-actions/verify-changed-files` action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. Details The `verify-changed-files` workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`. Proof of Concept 1. Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` would be a valid filename. 2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files tracked and untracked files` step. ```yaml • name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files run: | echo "Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}" ``` Example output: ```yaml [group]Run echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt" echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt" shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0} [endgroup] Changed files: runner.txt ``` Impact This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner. Resolution • A new `safe_output` input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments. • A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs. ```yaml • name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files env: CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }} run: | echo "Changed files: $CHANGED_FILES" ``` Resources • Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input • Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2023-52137 The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed… vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (2)

  • CWE-20 Improper Input Validation weakness
  • CWE-77 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command weakness

References