GHSA-gv83-gqw6-9j2c GoFiber never set HSTS header in helmet middleware due to incorrect protocol check

• Go github.com/gofiber/fiber: < 3.4.0 → fixed in 3.4.0

Summary The `helmet` middleware in gofiber/fiber never sets the `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) response header, even when `HSTSMaxAge` is explicitly configured, because the condition check at `helmet.go:67` uses `c.Protocol()` — which returns the HTTP protocol version string (e.g., `"HTTP/1.1"`, `"HTTP/2.0"`) — instead of `c.Scheme()` — which returns the URL scheme (`"http"` or `"https"`). Since `c.Protocol()` never equals `"https"` in any real deployment, the HSTS header is permanently disabled, defeating the security protection. Details Root cause: `middleware/helmet/helmet.go`, line 67: ```go if c.Protocol() == "https" && cfg.HSTSMaxAge != 0 { ``` `c.Protocol()` (defined at `req.go:865-867`) delegates to `fasthttp.Request.Header.Protocol()`, which returns the HTTP protocol version: • `"HTTP/1.1"` for HTTP/1.1 connections • `"HTTP/2.0"` for HTTP/2 connections The correct method is `c.Scheme()` (defined at `req.go:844-862`), which returns: • `"http"` for plain HTTP connections • `"https"` for TLS connections Since `"HTTP/1.1" != "https"` always evaluates to `true`, the entire HSTS block (lines 67-76) is dead code. Note on test coverage: The existing helmet test (`helmet_test.go`) passes because it uses `ctx.Request.Header.SetProtocol("https")` to artificially force `Protocol()` to return `"https"`. However, `fasthttp.Request.Header.SetProtocol()` sets the HTTP version field, and real HTTP requests never have protocol `"https"` — they have `"HTTP/1.1"` or `"HTTP/2.0"`. The test is validating the wrong thing. PoC Clean-checkout maintainer-runnable recipe: 1. Save the following as `middleware/helmet/poc_hsts_test.go`: ```go package helmet import ( "crypto/tls" "net/http/httptest" "testing" "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3" ) func Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet(t *testing.T) { app := fiber.New() app.Use(New(Config{ HSTSMaxAge: 31536000, })) app.Get("/", func(c fiber.Ctx) error { return c.SendString("ok") }) // Simulate HTTPS connection req := httptest.NewRequest(fiber.MethodGet, "/", nil) req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{} resp, _ := app.Test(req) hsts := resp.Header.Get("Strict-Transport-Security") if hsts == "" { t.Log("BUG CONFIRMED: HSTS header not set. c.Protocol() returns 'HTTP/1.1', not 'https'") t.Log("Fix: change c.Protocol() == 'https' to c.Scheme() == 'https' on line 67") } } ``` 2. Run: `go test -run Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet -v ./middleware/helmet/` Expected vulnerable output: ``` === RUN Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet BUG CONFIRMED: HSTS header not set. c.Protocol() returns 'HTTP/1.1', not 'https' Fix: change c.Protocol() == 'https' to c.Scheme() == 'https' on line 67 --- PASS: Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet ``` Expected output after fix: ``` === RUN Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet --- PASS: Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet (HSTS header is set: "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains") ``` Observed output from this environment (commit `ee98695f`): ``` === RUN Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet poc_hsts_test.go:39: HSTS header value: "" poc_hsts_test.go:42: BUG CONFIRMED: HSTS header is NOT set even over TLS poc_hsts_test.go:43: Root cause: helmet.go:67 uses c.Protocol() which returns HTTP version poc_hsts_test.go:44: c.Protocol() returns 'HTTP/1.1' not 'https' poc_hsts_test.go:45: Fix: use c.Scheme() == 'https' instead of c.Protocol() == 'https' --- PASS: Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet ``` Negative/control case: With `HSTSMaxAge: 0` (default), HSTS is correctly not set (this is expected behavior, not a bug). Cleanup: Remove `poc_hsts_test.go` after verification. Impact The HSTS header is never applied in production, leaving all users vulnerable to: • SSL stripping attacks: An active network attacker can downgrade HTTPS connections to HTTP, intercepting traffic between the client and server. • Protocol downgrade: Without HSTS, browsers will silently accept HTTP connections to the site, even if the site supports HTTPS. • Cookie theft over HTTP: Session cookies without the `Secure` flag will be sent over HTTP if the user is tricked into an HTTP connection. This affects any application that: 1. Uses the `helmet` middleware 2. Configures `HSTSMaxAge > 0` expecting HSTS protection 3. Serves traffic over HTTPS The vulnerability requires an active MITM attacker on the network path, which is realistic in public Wi-Fi, corporate networks, and ISP-level scenarios. Suggested remediation In `middleware/helmet/helmet.go`, line 67, replace `c.Protocol()` with `c.Scheme()`: ```go // Before (broken): if c.Protocol() == "https" && cfg.HSTSMaxAge != 0 { // After (fixed): if c.Scheme() == "https" && cfg.HSTSMaxAge != 0 { ``` Additionally, update the existing test to use a realistic TLS simulation instead of `SetProtocol("https")`: ```go // Before (artificial - sets HTTP version to "https" which never happens in practice): ctx.Request.Header.SetProtocol("https") // After (realistic - simulates TLS connection): ctx.RequestCtx().Request.Header.SetProtocol("HTTP/1.1") ctx.RequestCtx().TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{} ``` Regression test: Add a test case that verifies HSTS is set when `req.TLS` is non-nil and `HSTSMaxAge > 0`, without using `SetProtocol`.