GHSA-h39g-6x3c-7fq9 Zio has SubFileSystem Path Confinement Bypass via Unresolved `..` Segment

• NuGet Zio: < 0.22.2 → fixed in 0.22.2

Summary `SubFileSystem` fails to confine operations to its declared sub path when the input path is `/../` (or equivalents `/../`, `/..\\`). This path passes all validation but resolves to the root of the parent filesystem, allowing directory level operations outside the intended boundary. Affected Component `Zio.UPath.ValidateAndNormalize` `Zio.FileSystems.SubFileSystem` `UPath.ValidateAndNormalize` has a trailing slash optimisation. ```csharp if (!processParts && i + 1 == path.Length) return path.Substring(0, path.Length - 1); ``` When the input ends with `/` or `\`, and `processParts` is still false, the function strips the trailing separator and returns immediately before the `..` resolution logic runs. The input `/../` triggers this path: the trailing `/` is the last character, `processParts` has not been set (because `..` as the first relative segment after root is specifically exempted), so the function returns `/..` with the `..` segment unresolved. The resulting `UPath` with `FullName = "/.."` is absolute, contains no control characters, and no colon so it passes `FileSystem.ValidatePath` without rejection. When this path reaches `SubFileSystem.ConvertPathToDelegate`: ```csharp protected override UPath ConvertPathToDelegate(UPath path) { var safePath = path.ToRelative(); // "/..".ToRelative() = ".." return SubPath / safePath; // "/jail" / ".." = "/" (resolved by Combine) } ``` The delegate filesystem receives `/` (the root) instead of a path under `/jail`. Proof of Concept ```csharp using Zio; using Zio.FileSystems; var root = new MemoryFileSystem(); root.CreateDirectory("/sandbox"); var sub = new SubFileSystem(root, "/sandbox"); Console.WriteLine(sub.DirectoryExists("/../")); // True (sees parent root) Console.WriteLine(sub.ConvertPathToInternal("/../")); // "/" (parent root path) ``` Impact The escape is limited to directory level operations because appending a filename after `..` (e.g., `/../file.txt`) causes normal `..` resolution to trigger, which correctly rejects the path as going above root. Only the bare terminal `/../` (which strips to `/..`) survives. This means that exploitability is limited, and this vulnerability does not escalate to file read/write.