GitHub Advisoryadvisory · crates.io

GHSA-h4h3-3rfj-x6fq SurrealDB: Indexed ORDER BY leaks the value ordering of a SELECT-restricted field

MEDIUM Published 2026-06-19 Modified 2026-06-19 Official page ↗
Ecosystem
crates.io
Packages
surrealdb
Severity
Moderate
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Weaknesses
CWE-200
Reviewed
2026-06-19

Affected packages

• crates.io surrealdb: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.5 → fixed in 3.1.5

Description

A field can be hidden from a user with a field-level SELECT permission (`DEFINE FIELD code ON secret PERMISSIONS FOR select WHERE owner = $auth.id`). When that field is indexed, a record user who cannot read it could still recover the relative ordering of its values across every record by issuing `ORDER BY `: the field came back `null` as intended, but the rows were returned in the hidden values' true sorted order. To satisfy the sort, the planner selects the field's index and walks it in value order; the field-level permission is applied later, when the row is projected, so the value is nulled but the row order already encodes it. The guard that withholds restricted fields from the `WHERE` path was never applied to `ORDER BY`. Impact What an attacker can do: • As a record (scope) user with table SELECT, learn the relative ordering of a field hidden by a field-level SELECT permission, across other users' records, by ordering on it when an index covers the field — the value returns `null`, but the rows come back in the hidden values' order. • With rows they control in the same table, use that ordering to narrow the hidden values toward exact ones. What it can't do: • Read the field value directly — only its relative ordering leaks; the projected value is correctly redacted. • Cross table, record, or namespace/database boundaries — the table's SELECT permission and any row-level `WHERE` are still enforced, so only records the caller may already read are ordered. • Leak anything when the restricted field is not indexed, affect root or record-owner sessions, or modify data (confidentiality only). Patches The query planner now applies the field-permission guard to the `ORDER BY` clause as well as the `WHERE` clause. When an ordered field is hidden from the caller by a field-level SELECT permission, the index sort pushdown is withheld and the rows are sorted after redaction instead, so the row order no longer reflects the hidden values. The dynamic-scan fallback is closed the same way, and a regression test was added. The fix is included in SurrealDB 3.1.5. Workarounds Users unable to upgrade are advised to consider the following: • Force the legacy executor with `SURREAL_PLANNER_STRATEGY=compute-only`; the sort then runs after redaction, so no ordering leaks. • Do not place an index on a field whose values are hidden by a field-level SELECT permission — without the index the leak does not occur. • Do not rely on field-level SELECT permissions to hide values on indexed fields from record users; restrict at the table level instead. • Use namespace / database isolation as the primary trust boundary where feasible. References • SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE FIELD • SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE INDEX • SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS • Related advisory (same class, indexed COUNT variant): GHSA-c8jx-96c9-8xrp • `fix(planner): prevent ORDER BY value-ordering oracle on restricted SELECT fields` • `fix(planner): close ORDER BY value-ordering oracle on the DynamicScan fallback` Acknowledgements Thanks to George Chen (@geo-chen) for finding and reporting this issue.

Related

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor weakness

References