GitHub Advisoryadvisory · crates.io
GHSA-h5rg-8p7f-47g2 SurrealDB: SSRF via JWKS URL — Redirect Following in JWT Key Fetch
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Ecosystem
- crates.io
- Packages
- surrealdb
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-918
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-19
Affected packages
• crates.io surrealdb: < 3.1.5 → fixed in 3.1.5
Description
SurrealDB fetches the JWKS document for a JWT or record access method using a bare `reqwest` client that follows HTTP redirects by default. The network capability check in `core/src/iam/jwks.rs` (`check_capabilities_url`) is applied only to the originally configured URL; redirect targets are not re-validated. An `--allow-net`-permitted JWKS host that returns a `3xx Location` can therefore redirect the request to an address the allowlist was meant to block, resulting in a server-side request forgery (SSRF). The protected `HttpClient` used by `http::*` functions re-checks every redirect hop and was hardened in 3.1.0, but the JWKS fetcher uses its own client and was not covered.
Impact
What an attacker can do:
• With the Owner role at database level or above (the minimum required to run `DEFINE ACCESS ... TYPE JWT URL` or `TYPE RECORD ... WITH JWT URL`), point an access method at an allowlisted host they control and redirect the server's GET to an otherwise-blocked target — cloud metadata, loopback, internal services — bypassing `--allow-net`/`--deny-net`.
• Infer the existence and liveness of internal hosts and ports from response-timing differences (bounded by the 1-second fetch timeout).
What it can't do:
• Read the response: the fetch is blind — the body is only parsed as a JWKS, and a non-JWKS response surfaces as an opaque `InvalidAuth` error. Nothing is returned to the caller.
• Modify data or affect availability (a single GET request).
Patches
The JWKS fetcher now applies a redirect policy that re-validates every redirect target against the configured network capabilities (mirroring `check_capabilities_url`) and caps redirects at `max_http_redirects`.
• Versions prior to 3.1.5 are vulnerable.
Workarounds
• Restrict the Owner role to trusted operators.
• Enforce egress filtering at the network layer (block link-local `169.254.0.0/16` and internal ranges) so redirect targets are unreachable regardless of in-process checks.
• Configure access methods to use only trusted JWKS hosts that do not redirect, or use locally defined keys instead of a remote JWKS.
References
• SurrealDB Documentation — Capabilities
• SurrealQL Documentation — DEFINE ACCESS
• `fix(iam): prevent SSRF in JWKS fetch by re-validating redirect targets`
Related
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery weakness