GitHub Advisoryadvisory · PyPI
GHSA-hgg8-fqqc-vfmw vLLM: incomplete CVE-2026-22778 fix leaks PIL repr addresses via Anthropic router
MEDIUM
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2026-54236
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Packages
- vllm
- Severity
- Moderate
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-532
- Reviewed
- 2026-06-17
Affected packages
• PyPI vllm: < 0.24.0 → fixed in 0.24.0
Description
vLLM: incomplete CVE-2026-22778 fix leaks PIL repr addresses via the Anthropic API router
Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research
Severity: CVSS 3.1 5.3 (Medium) `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N`
Target: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm
---
Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-22778 / GHSA-4r2x-xpjr-7cvv (PRs #31987 and #32319) introduced `sanitize_message` and applied it at four FastAPI exception-handling sites in the OpenAI router. The sanitizer strips object-repr memory addresses (`` → ``) before error messages reach the client, defeating the ASLR-bypass primitive that CVE-2026-22778 chained with a libopenjp2 heap overflow for RCE.
The fix is incomplete: response paths added to vLLM at or after the same time as the fix continue to echo `str(exc)` directly to clients without `sanitize_message`. The original Stage 1 primitive — sending malformed image bytes so PIL raises `UnidentifiedImageError` whose message contains the BytesIO object repr — reaches all of them unmodified and leaks the heap address verbatim in the response body.
All five lines below are present in `main` HEAD (`771e1e48b`, 2026-05-26).
Affected sites
Current `main` HEAD (`771e1e48b`, 2026-05-26):
| # | File | Line | Code |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` | 78 | `message=str(e),` (inside `POST /v1/messages` exception handler) |
| 2 | `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` | 124 | `message=str(e),` (inside `POST /v1/messages/count_tokens`) |
| 3 | `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/serving.py` | 808 | `error=AnthropicError(type="internal_error", message=str(e)),` (SSE streaming converter) |
| 4 | `vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py` | 75 | `await self.send_error(str(e), "processing_error")` (WebSocket event loop) |
| 5 | `vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py` | 265 | `await self.send_error(str(e), "processing_error")` (WebSocket generation loop) |
Why the global exception handler does not save these paths
`api_server.py` registers a catch-all `app.exception_handler(Exception)(exception_handler)` at line 262, and that handler calls `create_error_response(exc)` which DOES apply `sanitize_message`. However, FastAPI exception handlers fire only on unhandled exceptions that propagate out of a route function.
All affected HTTP paths catch `Exception` *inside* the route coroutine and construct the response themselves:
```python
vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py:71-81 (POST /v1/messages)
try:
generator = await handler.create_messages(request, raw_request)
except Exception as e:
logger.exception("Error in create_messages: %s", e)
return JSONResponse(
status_code=HTTPStatus.INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR.value,
content=AnthropicErrorResponse(
error=AnthropicError(
type="internal_error",
message=str(e), #
```
The exception propagates up through `handler.create_messages` into the `except Exception as e:` at `api_router.py:75`. `str(e)` returns the exception message verbatim, including the address. The address ends up in the `error.message` field of the JSON response body returned to the attacker. ASLR entropy on the affected process drops from ~4 billion to ~8 candidates, identically to CVE-2026-22778 Stage 1.
The same primitive is reachable on `POST /v1/messages/count_tokens` (route #2), inside the SSE streaming converter when an exception is raised mid-stream (route #3), and over the realtime speech-to-text WebSocket when audio decoder or generation paths raise an exception containing any object repr (routes #4, #5).
Chronology — these are scope misses, not legacy code
• 2026-01-09: PR #31987 (`aa125ecf0`) introduces `sanitize_message` and applies it to OpenAI router HTTP exception handlers.
• 2026-01-15 (six days later): PR #32369 (`4c1c501a7`) adds `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` containing line 78's `message=str(e)`. The fix was not applied to the new router.
• 2026-03-02 (~two months later): PR #35588 (`9a87b0578`) adds the Anthropic `count_tokens` endpoint, replicating the same `message=str(e)` pattern at line 124.
• 2026-05-12 (~four months later): PR #42370 (`d37e25ffb`) consolidates speech-to-text entrypoints and the realtime WebSocket uses `send_error(str(e), ...)` for both error paths.
• 2026-05-26: current `main` HEAD, all five lines still present.
CVSS v3.1
`AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` — Base 5.3 (MEDIUM)
The parent CVE-2026-22778 was 9.8 (CRITICAL) because it chained the Stage 1 leak with a Stage 2 libopenjp2 heap overflow. Stage 2 is patched in OpenCV ≥ 4.13.0 (PR #32668 bumped the requirement), so Stage 1 alone here is a partial ASLR-bypass info-disclosure primitive rather than a complete RCE. Deployments that ship vLLM alongside an older OpenCV/libopenjp2 (system OpenCV on long-LTS distros, custom Docker images, downstream rebuilds) re-enable the full chain via the affected endpoints.
CWE
CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File / Error Message). Same CWE assigned to the parent CVE-2026-22778.
Remediation
1. Apply `sanitize_message` symmetrically to the five sites
```python
vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py — add at top:
from vllm.entrypoints.utils import sanitize_message
Line 78 (POST /v1/messages) and Line 124 (count_tokens):
message=sanitize_message(str(e)),
```
```python
vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/serving.py — add at top:
from vllm.entrypoints.utils import sanitize_message
Line 808:
error=AnthropicError(type="internal_error", message=sanitize_message(str(e))),
```
```python
vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py — add at top:
from vllm.entrypoints.utils import sanitize_message
Lines 75 and 265:
await self.send_error(sanitize_message(str(e)), "processing_error")
```
2. Tighten the regex (defense in depth)
The current regex `r" at 0x[0-9a-f]+>"` is narrow — it only matches the exact CPython builtin object-repr suffix in lowercase hex with a trailing `>`. Future Python versions, C extensions, or custom `__repr__` methods could produce non-matching formats that re-enable the leak:
```python
vllm/entrypoints/utils.py
def sanitize_message(message: str) -> str:
# Strip any standalone hex address; downstream observers don't need them.
return re.sub(r"\b0x[0-9a-fA-F]{6,}\b", "0x?", message)
```
3. Future-proofing: consider a response middleware
Both the route-local exception handling pattern (Anthropic router) and the WebSocket path bypass FastAPI's exception handler chain. A response-level middleware that always invokes `sanitize_message` on outgoing error bodies would prevent this class of regression entirely.
Affected versions
• All vLLM versions containing `vllm/entrypoints/anthropic/api_router.py` (introduced 2026-01-15 in PR #32369).
• All vLLM versions containing `vllm/entrypoints/speech_to_text/realtime/connection.py` (introduced 2026-05-12 in PR #42370).
• Confirmed present in `main` HEAD `771e1e48b` (2026-05-26).
References
• Parent advisory: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/G…
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2026-54236 vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File weakness
References
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-hgg8-fqqc-vfmw web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54236 advisory
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/45119 web
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/94923629729381d7f7c9efde72071a2441f7fd82 web
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hgg8-fqqc-vfmw advisory
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-3408.yaml web
- https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm package
- https://pypi.org/project/vllm web