GHSA-hjwc-26pj-v3pm AgenticMail: Cross-agent task authorization bypass in AgenticMail API

• npm @agenticmail/api: < 0.9.64 → fixed in 0.9.64

Summary A low-privileged authenticated AgenticMail agent can enumerate another agent's pending/claimed tasks by supplying the target agent name to `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=`. The returned task objects include the task IDs and payloads. The same task IDs can then be used with the capability-style task mutation endpoints (`/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`) to claim, complete, or fail tasks assigned to a different agent. Because ordinary authenticated agents can discover agent names through `GET /api/agenticmail/accounts/directory`, the task ID effectively stops being a secret capability. This turns the intended capability model into a cross-agent authorization bypass. Affected component Package: `@agenticmail/api` Observed version: `0.9.62` Repository: `agenticmail/agenticmail` Relevant code paths: • `packages/api/src/app.ts`: `createAuthMiddleware(...)` is mounted before `createAccountRoutes(...)` and `createTaskRoutes(...)`, so these routes are reachable by any valid bearer token. • `packages/api/src/routes/accounts.ts`: `GET /accounts/directory` is available to any authenticated user and returns agent names. • `packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts`: `GET /tasks/pending?assignee=name` resolves arbitrary agent names and returns that agent's pending/claimed tasks. • `packages/api/src/routes/tasks.ts`: `/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`, and `/tasks/:id` do not check whether the authenticated caller is the task assignee, assigner, or otherwise authorized for the task. Impact An attacker only needs a valid agent API key. They can: 1. List agent names using `/accounts/directory`. 2. Query another agent's task queue using `/tasks/pending?assignee=`. 3. Read sensitive task payloads intended for the victim agent. 4. Use the disclosed task ID to complete/fail/claim the victim's task or submit attacker-controlled results. Local reproduction I reproduced this locally with a focused Vitest test mounted directly on `createTaskRoutes`. The test creates two agents, Alice and Bob, and one pending task assigned to Bob. Alice authenticates with her own agent key and performs the following sequence: 1. `GET /api/agenticmail/tasks/pending?assignee=Bob` with `Authorization: Bearer ak_alice`. 2. The response is HTTP 200 and includes Bob's task ID and payload: `task-for-bob`, `{ "task": "secret task intended for Bob" }`. 3. Alice then sends `POST /api/agenticmail/tasks/task-for-bob/complete` with her own bearer token and an attacker-controlled result. 4. The task status becomes `completed` and the stored result is controlled by Alice. The local verification command was: ```bash npm run test --workspace=@agenticmail/api -- task-routes-authz.test.ts ``` Result: ```text PASS src/__tests__/task-routes-authz.test.ts (1 test) ``` Expected behavior Task listing and task mutation endpoints should enforce an authorization relationship between the authenticated caller and the task. For example: • `GET /tasks/pending?assignee=` should either be restricted to the current agent, master/admin callers, or an explicit delegated relationship. • `/tasks/:id/claim`, `/tasks/:id/result`, `/tasks/:id/complete`, `/tasks/:id/fail`, and `/tasks/:id` should verify that the caller is the assignee, assigner, master/admin, or otherwise explicitly authorized. • If capability-based task IDs are retained, the API should not expose those IDs to unrelated agents through the assignee-name listing path. Credit Please credit the finder as: Yaohui Wang